linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v11 05/20] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL infrastructure

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Wed, 7 Jun 2023 13:08:39 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...il.com>
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com, tony.luck@...el.com,
        peterz@...radead.org, tglx@...utronix.de, pbonzini@...hat.com,
        david@...hat.com, dan.j.williams@...el.com,
        rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com, ying.huang@...el.com,
        reinette.chatre@...el.com, len.brown@...el.com, ak@...ux.intel.com,
        isaku.yamahata@...el.com, chao.gao@...el.com,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, bagasdotme@...il.com,
        sagis@...gle.com, imammedo@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 05/20] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL infrastructure

On Wed, Jun 07, 2023, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 07, 2023 at 12:27:33PM -0700,
> Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
> 
> > On 6/7/23 11:53, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> > >>> VMX enabling, and KVM is the only user of TDX.  This implementation
> > >>> chooses to make KVM itself responsible for enabling VMX before using
> > >>> TDX and let the rest of the kernel stay blissfully unaware of VMX.
> > >>>
> > >>> The current TDX_MODULE_CALL macro handles neither #GP nor #UD.  The
> > >>> kernel would hit Oops if SEAMCALL were mistakenly made w/o enabling VMX
> > >>> first.  Architecturally, there is no CPU flag to check whether the CPU
> > >>> is in VMX operation.  Also, if a BIOS were buggy, it could still report
> > >>> valid TDX private KeyIDs when TDX actually couldn't be enabled.
> > >> I'm not sure this is a great justification.  If the BIOS is lying to the
> > >> OS, we _should_ oops.
> > >>
> > >> How else can this happen other than silly kernel bugs.  It's OK to oops
> > >> in the face of silly kernel bugs.
> > > TDX KVM + reboot can hit #UD.  On reboot, VMX is disabled (VMXOFF) via
> > > syscore.shutdown callback.  However, guest TD can be still running to issue
> > > SEAMCALL resulting in #UD.
> > > 
> > > Or we can postpone the change and make the TDX KVM patch series carry a patch
> > > for it.
> > 
> > How does the existing KVM use of VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME avoid that problem?
> 
> extable. From arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> 
> .Lvmresume:
>         vmresume
>         jmp .Lvmfail
> 
> .Lvmlaunch:
>         vmlaunch
>         jmp .Lvmfail
> 
>         _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmresume, .Lfixup)
>         _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmlaunch, .Lfixup)

More specifically, KVM eats faults on VMX and SVM instructions that occur after
KVM forcefully disables VMX/SVM.

E.g. with reboot -f, this will be reached without first stopping VMs:

static void kvm_shutdown(void)
{
	/*
	 * Disable hardware virtualization and set kvm_rebooting to indicate
	 * that KVM has asynchronously disabled hardware virtualization, i.e.
	 * that relevant errors and exceptions aren't entirely unexpected.
	 * Some flavors of hardware virtualization need to be disabled before
	 * transferring control to firmware (to perform shutdown/reboot), e.g.
	 * on x86, virtualization can block INIT interrupts, which are used by
	 * firmware to pull APs back under firmware control.  Note, this path
	 * is used for both shutdown and reboot scenarios, i.e. neither name is
	 * 100% comprehensive.
	 */
	pr_info("kvm: exiting hardware virtualization\n");
	kvm_rebooting = true;
	on_each_cpu(hardware_disable_nolock, NULL, 1);
}

which KVM x86 (VMX and SVM) then queries when deciding what to do with a spurious
fault on a VMX/SVM instruction

/*
 * Handle a fault on a hardware virtualization (VMX or SVM) instruction.
 *
 * Hardware virtualization extension instructions may fault if a reboot turns
 * off virtualization while processes are running.  Usually after catching the
 * fault we just panic; during reboot instead the instruction is ignored.
 */
noinstr void kvm_spurious_fault(void)
{
	/* Fault while not rebooting.  We want the trace. */
	BUG_ON(!kvm_rebooting);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_spurious_fault);