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Message-ID: <bf797bc6-e264-02b0-12ee-c2ebf7c92d22@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 07:15:54 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@...ck.org, kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com,
tony.luck@...el.com, peterz@...radead.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
seanjc@...gle.com, pbonzini@...hat.com, david@...hat.com,
dan.j.williams@...el.com, rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com,
ying.huang@...el.com, reinette.chatre@...el.com,
len.brown@...el.com, ak@...ux.intel.com, isaku.yamahata@...el.com,
chao.gao@...el.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com,
bagasdotme@...il.com, sagis@...gle.com, imammedo@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 04/20] x86/cpu: Detect TDX partial write machine check
erratum
On 6/4/23 07:27, Kai Huang wrote:
> TDX memory has integrity and confidentiality protections. Violations of
> this integrity protection are supposed to only affect TDX operations and
> are never supposed to affect the host kernel itself. In other words,
> the host kernel should never, itself, see machine checks induced by the
> TDX integrity hardware.
At the risk of patting myself on the back by acking a changelog that I
wrote 95% of:
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
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