linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] Integer overflows while scanning for integers

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Message-ID: <9cd596d9-0ecb-29fc-fe18-f19b86a5ba44@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Date:   Fri, 9 Jun 2023 12:10:29 +0200
From:   Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>
To:     Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
        linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
        Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>,
        Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@...il.com>,
        Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@...il.com>,
        Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>, Gary Guo <gary@...yguo.net>,
        Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com>,
        Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@...ton.me>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@...nel.org>,
        John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] Integer overflows while scanning for integers

On 08/06/2023 17.27, Petr Mladek wrote:
> On Wed 2023-06-07 16:36:12, Kees Cook wrote:

> It seems that userspace implementation of sscanf() and vsscanf()
> returns -ERANGE in this case. It might be a reasonable solution.

Well. _Some_ userspace implementation does that. It's not in POSIX.
While "man scanf" lists that ERANGE error, it also explicitly says that:

CONFORMING TO
       The functions fscanf(), scanf(), and sscanf() conform to C89 and
C99 and POSIX.1-2001.  These standards do  not  specify  the
       ERANGE error.

I can't figure out what POSIX actually says should or could happen with
sscanf("99999999999999", "%i", &x);

> Well, there is a risk of introducing security problems. The error
> value might cause an underflow/overflow when the caller does not expect
> a negative value.

There is absolutely no way we can start letting sscanf() return a
negative err value, in exactly the same way we cannot possibly let
vsnprintf() do that. We can stop early, possibly with a WARNing if it's
the format string we're unhappy about ('cause that should be
compile-time constant or, e.g. in the netdevice name case, carefully
checked by the caller) and return "number of succesful conversions so
far" (scanf) / "number of bytes written to buffer" (printf).

> Alternative solution would be to update the "ip" code so that it
> reads the number separately and treat zero return value as
> -EINVAL.

The netdev naming code _could_ be updated to just not use scanf at all
or the bitmap of in-use numbers, just do the "sprintf(buf, fmt, i)" in a
loop and stop when the name is not in use. That's a win as long as there
are less than ~256 names already matching the pattern, but the
performance absolutely tanks if there are many more than that. So I
won't actually suggest that.

Rasmus