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Message-ID: <20230612042559.375660-45-michael.roth@amd.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:25:52 -0500
From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
To: <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
<linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, <x86@...nel.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <tglx@...utronix.de>,
<mingo@...hat.com>, <jroedel@...e.de>, <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
<hpa@...or.com>, <ardb@...nel.org>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
<seanjc@...gle.com>, <vkuznets@...hat.com>, <jmattson@...gle.com>,
<luto@...nel.org>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <slp@...hat.com>,
<pgonda@...gle.com>, <peterz@...radead.org>,
<srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>, <rientjes@...gle.com>,
<dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>, <tobin@....com>, <bp@...en8.de>,
<vbabka@...e.cz>, <kirill@...temov.name>, <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
<tony.luck@...el.com>, <marcorr@...gle.com>,
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
<alpergun@...gle.com>, <dgilbert@...hat.com>, <jarkko@...nel.org>,
<ashish.kalra@....com>, <nikunj.dadhania@....com>,
<liam.merwick@...cle.com>, <zhi.a.wang@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v9 44/51] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages
This will handle RMP table updates and direct map changes needed to put
a page into a private state before mapping it into an SEV-SNP guest.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +
3 files changed, 99 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 909ecd90d199..c5a1706387bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -4022,3 +4022,98 @@ void handle_rmp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code)
kvm_zap_gfn_range(kvm, gfn, gfn + PTRS_PER_PMD);
put_page(pfn_to_page(pfn));
}
+
+/* Check if GFN range is marked private in the KVM/gmem xarray. */
+static bool is_gfn_range_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
+{
+ gfn_t gfn = start;
+
+ while (gfn++ < end)
+ if (!kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn)) {
+ pr_debug("%s: overlap detected, GFN 0x%llx start 0x%llx end 0x%llx\n",
+ __func__, gfn, start, end);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Check that no pages in PFN range have already been set to private in RMP table. */
+static bool is_pfn_range_shared(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end)
+{
+ kvm_pfn_t pfn = start;
+
+ while (pfn++ < end) {
+ int ret, rmp_level;
+ bool assigned;
+
+ ret = snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &assigned, &rmp_level);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_debug("%s: failed to retrieve RMP entry, assuming overlap, PFN 0x%llx start 0x%llx end 0x%llx RMP level %d error %d\n",
+ __func__, pfn, start, end, rmp_level, ret);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (assigned == 1) {
+ pr_debug("%s: overlap detected, PFN 0x%llx start 0x%llx end 0x%llx RMP level %d\n",
+ __func__, pfn, start, end, rmp_level);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int get_supported_rmp_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD) || !IS_ALIGNED(gfn, PTRS_PER_PMD))
+ return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that both the desired GFN range states in the xarray, and
+ * current PFN range states in the RMP table, are conducive to
+ * creating a 2M private RMP entry.
+ */
+ if (is_gfn_range_private(kvm, gfn, gfn + PTRS_PER_PMD) &&
+ is_pfn_range_shared(pfn, pfn + PTRS_PER_PMD))
+ return PG_LEVEL_2M;
+
+ return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+}
+
+int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, u8 *max_level)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ int level, rc = 0;
+ bool assigned;
+
+ if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &assigned, &level);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* No conversion needed, just clamp xax_level according to RMP entry. */
+ if (assigned)
+ goto out_adjust_level;
+
+ if (*max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
+ level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
+ else
+ level = get_supported_rmp_level(kvm, pfn, gfn);
+
+ rc = rmp_make_private(pfn, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), level, sev->asid, false);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err_ratelimited("%s: failed gfn %llx pfn %llx level %d rc %d\n",
+ __func__, gfn, pfn, level, rc);
+
+out_adjust_level:
+ pr_debug("%s: pfn %llx gfn %llx max_level %d level %d assigned %d\n",
+ __func__, pfn, gfn, *max_level, level, assigned);
+ if (*max_level > level)
+ *max_level = level;
+
+ return rc;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 81b9f4e04a8d..9085a122907c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4934,6 +4934,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
.alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page,
+
+ .gmem_prepare = sev_gmem_prepare,
};
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index e73a58e489c7..0438f52e4396 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -770,6 +770,8 @@ void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void handle_rmp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code);
void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, u8 *max_level);
/* vmenter.S */
--
2.25.1
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