[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <168675651878.3255755.17510485264525909343.b4-ty@linux.dev>
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 15:31:28 +0000
From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>
To: kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev, Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@...gle.com>,
maz@...nel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>, catalin.marinas@....com,
yuzenghui@...wei.com, tabba@...gle.com, kaleshsingh@...gle.com,
suzuki.poulose@....com, will@...nel.org, james.morse@....com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: arm64: Use different pointer authentication keys for pKVM
On Wed, 14 Jun 2023 12:25:59 +0000, Mostafa Saleh wrote:
> When the use of pointer authentication is enabled in the kernel it
> applies to both the kernel itself as well as KVM's nVHE hypervisor. The
> same keys are used for both the kernel and the nVHE hypervisor, which is
> less than desirable for pKVM as the host is not trusted at runtime.
>
> Naturally, the fix is to use a different set of keys for the hypervisor
> when running in protected mode. Have the host generate a new set of keys
> for the hypervisor before deprivileging the kernel. While there might be
> other sources of random directly available at EL2, this keeps the
> implementation simple, and the host is trusted anyways until it is
> deprivileged.
>
> [...]
Applied to kvmarm/next, thanks!
[1/1] KVM: arm64: Use different pointer authentication keys for pKVM
https://git.kernel.org/kvmarm/kvmarm/c/8c15c2a02810
--
Best,
Oliver
Powered by blists - more mailing lists