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Message-ID: <0ec1f8e7-dfb8-b3bc-5df3-944506a9038d@ghiti.fr>
Date:   Thu, 15 Jun 2023 11:52:55 +0200
From:   Alexandre Ghiti <alex@...ti.fr>
To:     Andrew Jones <ajones@...tanamicro.com>,
        Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@...osinc.com>
Cc:     Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
        Ian Rogers <irogers@...gle.com>,
        Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
        Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
        Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
        Atish Patra <atishp@...shpatra.org>,
        Anup Patel <anup@...infault.org>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/10] drivers: perf: Implement perf event mmap support
 in the SBI backend


On 31/05/2023 17:02, Andrew Jones wrote:
> On Fri, May 12, 2023 at 10:53:18AM +0200, Alexandre Ghiti wrote:
>> We used to unconditionnally expose the cycle and instret csrs to
>> userspace, which gives rise to security concerns.
>>
>> So now we only allow access to hw counters from userspace through the perf
>> framework which will handle context switches, per-task events...etc. But
>> as we cannot break userspace, we give the user the choice to go back to
>> the previous behaviour by setting the sysctl perf_user_access.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@...osinc.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/riscv/kernel/perf_event.c |  18 ++-
>>   drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c   | 194 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>   2 files changed, 205 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/perf_event.c
>> index 94174a0fc251..3af9ca45b43f 100644
>> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/perf_event.c
>> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/perf_event.c
>> @@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
>>   // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>> +#include <linux/perf/riscv_pmu.h>
>>   #include <linux/sched_clock.h>
>>   
>>   void arch_perf_update_userpage(struct perf_event *event,
>>   			       struct perf_event_mmap_page *userpg, u64 now)
>>   {
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI
>> +	struct riscv_pmu *rvpmu = to_riscv_pmu(event->pmu);
>> +#endif
> Can avoid this pair of #ifdef/#endif's by just declaring rvpmu inside the
> if block below where it's needed. Or even just using to_riscv_pmu()
> directly in place of rvpmu.


Great, thanks


>
>>   	struct clock_read_data *rd;
>>   	unsigned int seq;
>>   	u64 ns;
>> @@ -14,7 +18,19 @@ void arch_perf_update_userpage(struct perf_event *event,
>>   	userpg->cap_user_rdpmc =
>>   		!!(event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT);
>>   
>> -	userpg->pmc_width = 64;
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI
>> +	/*
>> +	 * The counters are 64-bit but the priv spec doesn't mandate all the
>> +	 * bits to be implemented: that's why, counter width can vary based on
>> +	 * the cpu vendor.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (event->pmu->name &&
>> +	    !strncmp(event->pmu->name,
>> +		     RISCV_PMU_PDEV_NAME, sizeof(RISCV_PMU_PDEV_NAME)))
>> +		userpg->pmc_width = rvpmu->ctr_get_width(event->hw.idx) + 1;
>> +	else
>> +#endif
>> +		userpg->pmc_width = 64;
> Can leave the initialization to 64 above the #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI
> as is and drop the else.


Fine by me, thanks


>
>>   
>>   	do {
>>   		rd = sched_clock_read_begin(&seq);
>> diff --git a/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c b/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c
>> index 3b0ee2148054..d9bcc5cc6df5 100644
>> --- a/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c
>> +++ b/drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c
>> @@ -24,6 +24,14 @@
>>   #include <asm/sbi.h>
>>   #include <asm/hwcap.h>
>>   
>> +#define SYSCTL_NO_USER_ACCESS	0
>> +#define SYSCTL_USER_ACCESS	1
>> +#define SYSCTL_LEGACY		2
>> +
>> +#define PERF_EVENT_FLAG_NO_USER_ACCESS	BIT(SYSCTL_NO_USER_ACCESS)
>> +#define PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ACCESS	BIT(SYSCTL_USER_ACCESS)
>> +#define PERF_EVENT_FLAG_LEGACY		BIT(SYSCTL_LEGACY)
>> +
>>   PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(event, "config:0-47");
>>   PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(firmware, "config:63");
>>   
>> @@ -43,6 +51,9 @@ static const struct attribute_group *riscv_pmu_attr_groups[] = {
>>   	NULL,
>>   };
>>   
>> +/* Allow legacy access by default */
>> +static int sysctl_perf_user_access __read_mostly = SYSCTL_LEGACY;
>> +
> I'm still not in favor of this. Hopefully the distro discussions result in
> it being changed.


No progress on this front...


>>   /*
>>    * RISC-V doesn't have heterogeneous harts yet. This need to be part of
>>    * per_cpu in case of harts with different pmu counters
>> @@ -301,6 +312,11 @@ int riscv_pmu_get_hpm_info(u32 *hw_ctr_width, u32 *num_hw_ctr)
>>   }
>>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(riscv_pmu_get_hpm_info);
>>   
>> +static uint8_t pmu_sbi_csr_index(struct perf_event *event)
>> +{
>> +	return pmu_ctr_list[event->hw.idx].csr - CSR_CYCLE;
>> +}
>> +
>>   static unsigned long pmu_sbi_get_filter_flags(struct perf_event *event)
>>   {
>>   	unsigned long cflags = 0;
>> @@ -329,18 +345,34 @@ static int pmu_sbi_ctr_get_idx(struct perf_event *event)
>>   	struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(rvpmu->hw_events);
>>   	struct sbiret ret;
>>   	int idx;
>> -	uint64_t cbase = 0;
>> +	uint64_t cbase = 0, cmask = rvpmu->cmask;
>>   	unsigned long cflags = 0;
>>   
>>   	cflags = pmu_sbi_get_filter_flags(event);
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * In legacy mode, we have to force the fixed counters for those events
>> +	 * but not in the user access mode as we want to use the other counters
>> +	 * that support sampling/filtering.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (hwc->flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_LEGACY) {
>> +		if (event->attr.config == PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES) {
>> +			cflags |= SBI_PMU_CFG_FLAG_SKIP_MATCH;
>> +			cmask = 1;
>> +		} else if (event->attr.config == PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS) {
>> +			cflags |= SBI_PMU_CFG_FLAG_SKIP_MATCH;
>> +			cmask = 1UL << (CSR_INSTRET - CSR_CYCLE);
>> +		}
>> +	}
>> +
>>   	/* retrieve the available counter index */
>>   #if defined(CONFIG_32BIT)
>>   	ret = sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_PMU, SBI_EXT_PMU_COUNTER_CFG_MATCH, cbase,
>> -			rvpmu->cmask, cflags, hwc->event_base, hwc->config,
>> +			cmask, cflags, hwc->event_base, hwc->config,
>>   			hwc->config >> 32);
>>   #else
>>   	ret = sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_PMU, SBI_EXT_PMU_COUNTER_CFG_MATCH, cbase,
>> -			rvpmu->cmask, cflags, hwc->event_base, hwc->config, 0);
>> +			cmask, cflags, hwc->event_base, hwc->config, 0);
>>   #endif
>>   	if (ret.error) {
>>   		pr_debug("Not able to find a counter for event %lx config %llx\n",
>> @@ -474,6 +506,14 @@ static u64 pmu_sbi_ctr_read(struct perf_event *event)
>>   	return val;
>>   }
>>   
>> +static void pmu_sbi_set_scounteren(void *arg)
>> +{
>> +	struct perf_event *event = (struct perf_event *)arg;
>> +
>> +	csr_write(CSR_SCOUNTEREN,
>> +		  csr_read(CSR_SCOUNTEREN) | (1 << pmu_sbi_csr_index(event)));
>> +}
>> +
>>   static void pmu_sbi_ctr_start(struct perf_event *event, u64 ival)
>>   {
>>   	struct sbiret ret;
>> @@ -490,6 +530,18 @@ static void pmu_sbi_ctr_start(struct perf_event *event, u64 ival)
>>   	if (ret.error && (ret.error != SBI_ERR_ALREADY_STARTED))
>>   		pr_err("Starting counter idx %d failed with error %d\n",
>>   			hwc->idx, sbi_err_map_linux_errno(ret.error));
>> +
>> +	if (hwc->flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ACCESS &&
>> +	    hwc->flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT)
>> +		pmu_sbi_set_scounteren((void *)event);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void pmu_sbi_reset_scounteren(void *arg)
>> +{
>> +	struct perf_event *event = (struct perf_event *)arg;
>> +
>> +	csr_write(CSR_SCOUNTEREN,
>> +		  csr_read(CSR_SCOUNTEREN) & ~(1 << pmu_sbi_csr_index(event)));
>>   }
>>   
>>   static void pmu_sbi_ctr_stop(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long flag)
>> @@ -497,6 +549,10 @@ static void pmu_sbi_ctr_stop(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long flag)
>>   	struct sbiret ret;
>>   	struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
>>   
>> +	if (hwc->flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ACCESS &&
>> +	    hwc->flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT)
>> +		pmu_sbi_reset_scounteren((void *)event);
>> +
>>   	ret = sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_PMU, SBI_EXT_PMU_COUNTER_STOP, hwc->idx, 1, flag, 0, 0, 0);
>>   	if (ret.error && (ret.error != SBI_ERR_ALREADY_STOPPED) &&
>>   		flag != SBI_PMU_STOP_FLAG_RESET)
>> @@ -704,10 +760,13 @@ static int pmu_sbi_starting_cpu(unsigned int cpu, struct hlist_node *node)
>>   	struct cpu_hw_events *cpu_hw_evt = this_cpu_ptr(pmu->hw_events);
>>   
>>   	/*
>> -	 * Enable the access for CYCLE, TIME, and INSTRET CSRs from userspace,
>> -	 * as is necessary to maintain uABI compatibility.
>> +	 * We keep enabling userspace access to CYCLE, TIME and INSRET via the
>> +	 * legacy option but that will be removed in the future.
>>   	 */
>> -	csr_write(CSR_SCOUNTEREN, 0x7);
>> +	if (sysctl_perf_user_access == SYSCTL_LEGACY)
>> +		csr_write(CSR_SCOUNTEREN, 0x7);
>> +	else
>> +		csr_write(CSR_SCOUNTEREN, 0x2);
>>   
>>   	/* Stop all the counters so that they can be enabled from perf */
>>   	pmu_sbi_stop_all(pmu);
>> @@ -851,6 +910,123 @@ static void riscv_pmu_destroy(struct riscv_pmu *pmu)
>>   	cpuhp_state_remove_instance(CPUHP_AP_PERF_RISCV_STARTING, &pmu->node);
>>   }
>>   
>> +static void pmu_sbi_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
>> +{
>> +	/*
>> +	 * The permissions are set at event_init so that we do not depend
>> +	 * on the sysctl value that can change.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (sysctl_perf_user_access == SYSCTL_NO_USER_ACCESS)
>> +		event->hw.flags |= PERF_EVENT_FLAG_NO_USER_ACCESS;
>> +	else if (sysctl_perf_user_access == SYSCTL_USER_ACCESS)
>> +		event->hw.flags |= PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ACCESS;
>> +	else
>> +		event->hw.flags |= PERF_EVENT_FLAG_LEGACY;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void pmu_sbi_event_mapped(struct perf_event *event, struct mm_struct *mm)
>> +{
>> +	if (event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_NO_USER_ACCESS)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	/* In legacy mode, the first 3 CSRs are available. */
> first and third


Same comment as before, I'll remove this comment.


>
>> +	if (event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_LEGACY) {
>> +		if (event->attr.config != PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES &&
>> +		    event->attr.config != PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS) {
>> +			return;
>> +		}
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * The user mmapped the event to directly access it: this is where
>> +	 * we determine based on sysctl_perf_user_access if we grant userspace
>> +	 * the direct access to this event. That means that within the same
>> +	 * task, some events may be directly accessible and some other may not,
>> +	 * if the user changes the value of sysctl_perf_user_accesss in the
>> +	 * meantime.
>> +	 */
>> +
>> +	event->hw.flags |= PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * We must enable userspace access *before* advertising in the user page
>> +	 * that it is possible to do so to avoid any race.
>> +	 * And we must notify all cpus here because threads that currently run
>> +	 * on other cpus will try to directly access the counter too without
>> +	 * calling pmu_sbi_ctr_start.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ACCESS)
>> +		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm),
>> +				 pmu_sbi_set_scounteren, (void *)event, 1);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void pmu_sbi_event_unmapped(struct perf_event *event, struct mm_struct *mm)
>> +{
>> +	if (event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_NO_USER_ACCESS)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	/* In legacy mode, the first 3 CSRs are available. */
> first and third
>
>> +	if (event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_LEGACY) {
>> +		if (event->attr.config != PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES &&
>> +		    event->attr.config != PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS) {
>> +			return;
>> +		}
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Here we can directly remove user access since the user does not have
>> +	 * access to the user page anymore so we avoid the racy window where the
>> +	 * user could have read cap_user_rdpmc to true right before we disable
>> +	 * it.
>> +	 */
>> +	event->hw.flags &= ~PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT;
>> +
>> +	if (event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ACCESS)
>> +		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm),
>> +				 pmu_sbi_reset_scounteren, (void *)event, 1);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void riscv_pmu_update_counter_access(void *info)
>> +{
>> +	if (sysctl_perf_user_access == SYSCTL_LEGACY)
>> +		csr_write(CSR_SCOUNTEREN, 0x7);
>> +	else
>> +		csr_write(CSR_SCOUNTEREN, 0x2);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int riscv_pmu_proc_user_access_handler(struct ctl_table *table,
>> +					      int write, void *buffer,
>> +					      size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
>> +{
>> +	int prev = sysctl_perf_user_access;
>> +	int ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Test against the previous value since we clear SCOUNTEREN when
>> +	 * sysctl_perf_user_access is set to SYSCTL_USER_ACCESS, but we should
>> +	 * not do that if that was already the case.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (ret || !write || prev == sysctl_perf_user_access)
>> +		return ret;
>> +
>> +	on_each_cpu(riscv_pmu_update_counter_access, (void *)&prev, 1);
> Instead of passing prev shouldn't we pass NULL, as it's not used?


Yes, that's a leftover from a previous version, thanks!


>
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static struct ctl_table sbi_pmu_sysctl_table[] = {
>> +	{
>> +		.procname       = "perf_user_access",
>> +		.data		= &sysctl_perf_user_access,
>> +		.maxlen		= sizeof(unsigned int),
>> +		.mode           = 0644,
>> +		.proc_handler	= riscv_pmu_proc_user_access_handler,
>> +		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
>> +		.extra2		= SYSCTL_TWO,
>> +	},
>> +	{ }
>> +};
>> +
>>   static int pmu_sbi_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>>   {
>>   	struct riscv_pmu *pmu = NULL;
>> @@ -888,6 +1064,10 @@ static int pmu_sbi_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>>   	pmu->ctr_get_width = pmu_sbi_ctr_get_width;
>>   	pmu->ctr_clear_idx = pmu_sbi_ctr_clear_idx;
>>   	pmu->ctr_read = pmu_sbi_ctr_read;
>> +	pmu->event_init = pmu_sbi_event_init;
>> +	pmu->event_mapped = pmu_sbi_event_mapped;
>> +	pmu->event_unmapped = pmu_sbi_event_unmapped;
>> +	pmu->csr_index = pmu_sbi_csr_index;
>>   
>>   	ret = cpuhp_state_add_instance(CPUHP_AP_PERF_RISCV_STARTING, &pmu->node);
>>   	if (ret)
>> @@ -901,6 +1081,8 @@ static int pmu_sbi_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>>   	if (ret)
>>   		goto out_unregister;
>>   
>> +	register_sysctl("kernel", sbi_pmu_sysctl_table);
>> +
>>   	return 0;
>>   
>>   out_unregister:
>> -- 
>> 2.37.2
>>
> Thanks,
> drew

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