linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization

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Date:   Fri, 16 Jun 2023 16:25:02 +0800
From:   "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
CC:     <pbonzini@...hat.com>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <peterz@...radead.org>,
        <rppt@...nel.org>, <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>,
        <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, <john.allen@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization


On 6/16/2023 7:30 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, May 11, 2023, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>> The last patch is introduced to support supervisor SHSTK but the feature is
>> not enabled on Intel platform for now, the main purpose of this patch is to
>> facilitate AMD folks to enable the feature.
> I am beyond confused by the SDM's wording of CET_SSS.
>
> First, it says that CET_SSS says the CPU isn't buggy (or maybe "less buggy" is
> more appropriate phrasing).
>
>    Bit 18: CET_SSS. If 1, indicates that an operating system can enable supervisor
>    shadow stacks as long as it ensures that certain supervisor shadow-stack pushes
>    will not cause page faults (see Section 17.2.3 of the Intel® 64 and IA-32
>    Architectures Software Developer’s Manual, Volume 1).
>
> But then it says says VMMs shouldn't set the bit.
>
>    When emulating the CPUID instruction, a virtual-machine monitor should return
>    this bit as 0 if those pushes can cause VM exits.
>
> Based on the Xen code (which is sadly a far better source of information than the
> SDM), I *think* that what the SDM is trying to say is that VMMs should not set
> CET_SS if VM-Exits can occur ***and*** the bit is not set in the host CPU.  Because
> if the SDM really means "VMMs should never set the bit", then what on earth is the
> point of the bit.

I need to double check for the vague description.

 From my understanding, on bare metal side, if the bit is 1, OS can 
enable SSS if pushes won't cause

page fault. But for VM case, it's not recommended(regardless of the bit 
state) to set the bit as vm-exits

caused by guest SSS pushes cannot be fully excluded.

In other word, the bit is mainly for bare metal guidance now.

>> In summary, this new series enables CET user SHSTK/IBT and kernel IBT, but
>> doesn't fully support CET supervisor SHSTK, the enabling work is left for
>> the future.
> Why?  If my interpretation of the SDM is correct, then all the pieces are there.

My assumption is,  VM supervisor SHSTK depends bare metal kernel support 
as PL0_SSP MSR is

backed by XSAVES via IA32_XSS:bit12(CET_S), but this part of support is 
not there in Rick's native series.

And also based on above SDM description, I don't want to add the support 
blindly now.

> [...]