linux-kernel - [PATCH 1/1] nospec: Add documentation for array_index

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Message-ID: <20230616133735.351479-2-jordyzomer@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 16 Jun 2023 13:37:35 +0000
From:   Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@...gle.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     corbet@....net, jordyzomer@...gle.com, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
        daniel@...earbox.net, tglx@...utronix.de, rdunlap@...radead.org,
        pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] nospec: Add documentation for array_index_nospec

array_index_nospec() should only be used if the upper boundary is a built
time constant. Otherwise the boundary could be speculated on as well.
While it might be more difficult to control two loads, it doesn't rule
out the problem. Adding this to the documentation so people won't mis-use
it instead of barrier_nospec().

Signed-off-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@...gle.com>
---
 Documentation/staging/speculation.rst | 5 +++++
 include/linux/nospec.h                | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/staging/speculation.rst b/Documentation/staging/speculation.rst
index 8045d99bcf12..efc0ab32263b 100644
--- a/Documentation/staging/speculation.rst
+++ b/Documentation/staging/speculation.rst
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index
 value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation
 conditions.
 
+Please note that this function should only be used if the upper
+boundary is a built-time constant, otherwise this could be
+speculated on as well. If this is not the case please refer to
+barrier_nospec().
+
 This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example::
 
 	int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
index 9f0af4f116d9..1d72c40595f4 100644
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
  * ...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then
  * array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0,
  * size).
+ *
+ * Please note that this function should only be used if the upper
+ * boundary is a built-time constant, otherwise this could be
+ * speculated on as well. If this is not the case please refer to
+ * barrier_nospec().
  */
 #define array_index_nospec(index, size)					\
 ({									\
-- 
2.41.0.162.gfafddb0af9-goog