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Message-ID: <ZJMdKUr98H8zPSAl@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 08:54:17 -0700
From: Breno Leitao <leitao@...ian.org>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, leit@...com,
"open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/bugs: Break down mitigations configurations
On Tue, Jun 20, 2023 at 05:13:27PM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 16, 2023 at 09:48:50AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote:
> > There is no way to disable MDS, TAA, MMIO Stale data mitigation today at
> > compilation time. These mitigations are enabled even if
> > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is unset.
> >
> > Create a new KCONFIG option for each mitigation under
> > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS that allows these
> > mitigations to be disabled by default at compilation time.
>
> I don't think all mitigations are still controllable at build-time e.g.
> spectre_v2 eIBRS mitigation will still be deployed irrespective of the
> config.
Right. This patchset only cares about MDS, TAA and MMIO. I am more than
happy to send a new patch to also disable spectre_v2 eIBRS.
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