linux-kernel - RE: [RFC PATCH 0/6] KVM: guest memory: Misc enhacnement

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Wed, 21 Jun 2023 18:19:57 +0000
From:   "Dong, Eddie" <eddie.dong@...el.com>
To:     "Annapurve, Vishal" <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
        Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@...il.com>
CC:     "Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "isaku.yamahata@...il.com" <isaku.yamahata@...il.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        "Aktas, Erdem" <erdemaktas@...gle.com>,
        "Christopherson,, Sean" <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        "Shahar, Sagi" <sagis@...gle.com>,
        David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>,
        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>,
        "Chen, Bo2" <chen.bo@...el.com>,
        "linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>,
        Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
        Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>,
        "Michael Roth" <michael.roth@....com>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH 0/6] KVM: guest memory: Misc enhacnement



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>
> Sent: Monday, June 19, 2023 2:55 PM
> To: Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@...il.com>
> Cc: Yamahata, Isaku <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>; kvm@...r.kernel.org;
> linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org; isaku.yamahata@...il.com; Paolo Bonzini
> <pbonzini@...hat.com>; Aktas, Erdem <erdemaktas@...gle.com>;
> Christopherson,, Sean <seanjc@...gle.com>; Shahar, Sagi
> <sagis@...gle.com>; David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>; Huang, Kai
> <kai.huang@...el.com>; Chen, Bo2 <chen.bo@...el.com>; linux-
> coco@...ts.linux.dev; Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>; Ackerley
> Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>; Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/6] KVM: guest memory: Misc enhacnement
> 
> On Mon, Jun 19, 2023 at 1:11 PM Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@...il.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 19 Jun 2023 12:11:50 -0700
> > Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, Jun 15, 2023 at 1:12___PM <isaku.yamahata@...el.com> wrote:
> > > > ...
> > > >
> > > > * VM type: Now we have KVM_X86_PROTECTED_VM. How do we
> proceed?
> > > >   - Keep KVM_X86_PROTECTED_VM for its use. Introduce
> KVM_X86_TDX_VM
> > > >   - Use KVM_X86_PROTECTED_VM for TDX. (If necessary, introduce
> another type in
> > > >     the future)
> > > >   - any other way?
> > >
> > > There are selftests posted[1] in context of this work, which rely on
> > > KVM_X86_PROTECTED_VM being just the software-only
> > > psuedo-confidential VMs. In future there might be more work to
> > > expand this usecase to full-scale VMs. So it would be better to
> > > treat protected VMs as a separate type which can be used on any
> > > platform without the need of enabling TDX/SEV functionality.
> > >
> >
> > Out of curiosity, is this really a valid case in practice except selftest?
> > It sounds to me whenever KVM_X86_PROTECTED_VM is used, it has to be
> > tied with a platform-specific CC type.
> 
> Protected VM effort is about being able to have guest memory ranges not
> mapped into Userspace VMM and so are unreachable for most of the cases
> from KVM as well. Non-CC VMs can use this support to mitigate any
> unintended accesses from userspace VMM/KVM possibly using enlightened
> kernels.

"PROTECTED" seems to be not very close to what you mean here. "PROTECTED_MEM" ?
What case of non-CC VMs may use this feature in reality?  Or do you have any expected cases?

> 
> Exact implementation of such a support warrants more discussion but it
> should be in the line of sight here as a future work item.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> >
> > > TDX VM type can possibly serve as a specialized type of protected VM
> > > with additional arch specific capabilities enabled.
> > >
> > > [1] - https://github.com/sean-jc/linux/commits/x86/kvm_gmem_solo
> >