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Message-Id: <3086d189fa629e6c7bf800832921669450cc09bf.1687343697.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Date:   Wed, 21 Jun 2023 12:37:19 +0200
From:   Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>
To:     Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
        Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>
Cc:     Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org
Subject: [PATCH] powerpc/ptrace: Split gpr32_set_common

objtool report the following warning:

  arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.o: warning: objtool:
    gpr32_set_common+0x23c (.text+0x860): redundant UACCESS disable

gpr32_set_common() conditionnaly opens and closes UACCESS based on
whether kbuf point is NULL or not. This is wackelig.

Split gpr32_set_common() in two fonctions, one for user one for
kernel.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.c | 106 ++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.c
index 3910cd7bb2d9..1b0c2a234a7e 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.c
@@ -716,73 +716,89 @@ int gpr32_get_common(struct task_struct *target,
 	return membuf_zero(&to, (ELF_NGREG - PT_REGS_COUNT) * sizeof(u32));
 }
 
-int gpr32_set_common(struct task_struct *target,
-		     const struct user_regset *regset,
-		     unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
-		     const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf,
-		     unsigned long *regs)
+int gpr32_set_common_kernel(struct task_struct *target,
+			    const struct user_regset *regset,
+			    unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
+			    const void *kbuf, unsigned long *regs)
 {
 	const compat_ulong_t *k = kbuf;
+
+	pos /= sizeof(compat_ulong_t);
+	count /= sizeof(compat_ulong_t);
+
+	for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_MSR; --count)
+		regs[pos++] = *k++;
+
+	if (count > 0 && pos == PT_MSR) {
+		set_user_msr(target, *k++);
+		++pos;
+		--count;
+	}
+
+	for (; count > 0 && pos <= PT_MAX_PUT_REG; --count)
+		regs[pos++] = *k++;
+	for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_TRAP; --count, ++pos)
+		++k;
+
+	if (count > 0 && pos == PT_TRAP) {
+		set_user_trap(target, *k++);
+		++pos;
+		--count;
+	}
+
+	kbuf = k;
+	pos *= sizeof(compat_ulong_t);
+	count *= sizeof(compat_ulong_t);
+	user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, NULL,
+				  (PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(compat_ulong_t), -1);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int gpr32_set_common_user(struct task_struct *target,
+			  const struct user_regset *regset,
+			  unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
+			  const void __user *ubuf, unsigned long *regs)
+{
 	const compat_ulong_t __user *u = ubuf;
 	compat_ulong_t reg;
 
-	if (!kbuf && !user_read_access_begin(u, count))
+	if (!user_read_access_begin(u, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	pos /= sizeof(reg);
 	count /= sizeof(reg);
 
-	if (kbuf)
-		for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_MSR; --count)
-			regs[pos++] = *k++;
-	else
-		for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_MSR; --count) {
-			unsafe_get_user(reg, u++, Efault);
-			regs[pos++] = reg;
-		}
-
+	for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_MSR; --count) {
+		unsafe_get_user(reg, u++, Efault);
+		regs[pos++] = reg;
+	}
 
 	if (count > 0 && pos == PT_MSR) {
-		if (kbuf)
-			reg = *k++;
-		else
-			unsafe_get_user(reg, u++, Efault);
+		unsafe_get_user(reg, u++, Efault);
 		set_user_msr(target, reg);
 		++pos;
 		--count;
 	}
 
-	if (kbuf) {
-		for (; count > 0 && pos <= PT_MAX_PUT_REG; --count)
-			regs[pos++] = *k++;
-		for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_TRAP; --count, ++pos)
-			++k;
-	} else {
-		for (; count > 0 && pos <= PT_MAX_PUT_REG; --count) {
-			unsafe_get_user(reg, u++, Efault);
-			regs[pos++] = reg;
-		}
-		for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_TRAP; --count, ++pos)
-			unsafe_get_user(reg, u++, Efault);
+	for (; count > 0 && pos <= PT_MAX_PUT_REG; --count) {
+		unsafe_get_user(reg, u++, Efault);
+		regs[pos++] = reg;
 	}
+	for (; count > 0 && pos < PT_TRAP; --count, ++pos)
+		unsafe_get_user(reg, u++, Efault);
 
 	if (count > 0 && pos == PT_TRAP) {
-		if (kbuf)
-			reg = *k++;
-		else
-			unsafe_get_user(reg, u++, Efault);
+		unsafe_get_user(reg, u++, Efault);
 		set_user_trap(target, reg);
 		++pos;
 		--count;
 	}
-	if (!kbuf)
-		user_read_access_end();
+	user_read_access_end();
 
-	kbuf = k;
 	ubuf = u;
 	pos *= sizeof(reg);
 	count *= sizeof(reg);
-	user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+	user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, NULL, &ubuf,
 				  (PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(reg), -1);
 	return 0;
 
@@ -791,6 +807,18 @@ int gpr32_set_common(struct task_struct *target,
 	return -EFAULT;
 }
 
+int gpr32_set_common(struct task_struct *target,
+		     const struct user_regset *regset,
+		     unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
+		     const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf,
+		     unsigned long *regs)
+{
+	if (kbuf)
+		return gpr32_set_common_kernel(target, regset, pos, count, kbuf, regs);
+	else
+		return gpr32_set_common_user(target, regset, pos, count, ubuf, regs);
+}
+
 static int gpr32_get(struct task_struct *target,
 		     const struct user_regset *regset,
 		     struct membuf to)
-- 
2.40.1

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