linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 3/6] x86/cfi: Extend ENDBR sealing to kCFI

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Message-ID: <20230622144321.494426891@infradead.org>
Date:   Thu, 22 Jun 2023 16:42:21 +0200
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To:     x86@...nel.org, alyssa.milburn@...ux.intel.com
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, peterz@...radead.org,
        samitolvanen@...gle.com, keescook@...omium.org,
        jpoimboe@...nel.org, joao@...rdrivepizza.com, brgerst@...il.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/6] x86/cfi: Extend ENDBR sealing to kCFI

Kees noted that IBT sealing could be extended to kCFI.

Fundamentally it is the list of functions that do not have their
address taken and are thus never called indirectly. It doesn't matter
that objtool uses IBT infrastructure to determine this list, once we
have it it can also be used to clobber kCFI hashes and seal kCFI
indirect calls.

Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c |   44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -778,6 +778,8 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
 
+static void poison_cfi(void *addr);
+
 static void __init_or_module poison_endbr(void *addr, bool warn)
 {
 	u32 endbr, poison = gen_endbr_poison();
@@ -802,6 +804,9 @@ static void __init_or_module poison_endb
 
 /*
  * Generated by: objtool --ibt
+ *
+ * Seal the functions for indirect calls by clobbering the ENDBR instructions
+ * and the kCFI hash value.
  */
 void __init_or_module noinline apply_seal_endbr(s32 *start, s32 *end)
 {
@@ -812,7 +817,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_sea
 
 		poison_endbr(addr, true);
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FINEIBT))
-			poison_endbr(addr - 16, false);
+			poison_cfi(addr - 16);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -1177,6 +1182,41 @@ static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_r
 	pr_err("Something went horribly wrong trying to rewrite the CFI implementation.\n");
 }
 
+static inline void poison_hash(void *addr)
+{
+	*(u32 *)addr = 0;
+}
+
+static void poison_cfi(void *addr)
+{
+	switch (cfi_mode) {
+	case CFI_FINEIBT:
+		/*
+		 * __cfi_\func:
+		 *	osp nopl (%rax)
+		 *	subl	$0, %r10d
+		 *	jz	1f
+		 *	ud2
+		 * 1:	nop
+		 */
+		poison_endbr(addr, false);
+		poison_hash(addr + fineibt_preamble_hash);
+		break;
+
+	case CFI_KCFI:
+		/*
+		 * __cfi_\func:
+		 *	movl	$0, %eax
+		 *	.skip	11, 0x90
+		 */
+		poison_hash(addr + 1);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 #else
 
 static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_retpoline, s32 *end_retpoline,
@@ -1184,6 +1224,8 @@ static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_r
 {
 }
 
+static void poison_cfi(void *addr) { }
+
 #endif
 
 void apply_fineibt(s32 *start_retpoline, s32 *end_retpoline,