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Message-ID: <000000000000ded70105fef7cd35@google.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Jun 2023 10:45:47 -0700
From: syzbot <syzbot+dd6352699b8027673b35@...kaller.appspotmail.com>
To: chao@...nel.org, jaegeuk@...nel.org,
linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: [syzbot] [f2fs?] possible deadlock in f2fs_fiemap
Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: 15e71592dbae Add linux-next specific files for 20230621
git tree: linux-next
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=101c827b280000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=b4e51841f618f374
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dd6352699b8027673b35
compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/6b6464ef4887/disk-15e71592.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/81eba5775318/vmlinux-15e71592.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bc7983587629/bzImage-15e71592.xz
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+dd6352699b8027673b35@...kaller.appspotmail.com
loop4: detected capacity change from 0 to 40427
F2FS-fs (loop4): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
F2FS-fs (loop4): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e5
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.4.0-rc7-next-20230621-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.4/7658 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888012869e20 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0xb2/0x190 mm/memory.c:5716
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880865b1a10 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#23){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:771 [inline]
ffff8880865b1a10 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#23){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_fiemap+0x1e3/0x1670 fs/f2fs/data.c:1998
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#23){+.+.}-{3:3}:
down_write+0x92/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1573
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:771 [inline]
f2fs_file_mmap+0x154/0x290 fs/f2fs/file.c:527
call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1876 [inline]
mmap_region+0x6cf/0x2570 mm/mmap.c:2669
do_mmap+0x850/0xee0 mm/mmap.c:1373
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1a2/0x3b0 mm/util.c:543
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x42b/0x5b0 mm/mmap.c:1419
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
-> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2e9d/0x5e20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
lock_acquire.part.0+0x11c/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
__might_fault mm/memory.c:5717 [inline]
__might_fault+0x115/0x190 mm/memory.c:5710
_copy_to_user+0x2b/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:36
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline]
fiemap_fill_next_extent+0x217/0x370 fs/ioctl.c:144
f2fs_fiemap+0x5a5/0x1670 fs/f2fs/data.c:2066
ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:219 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x478/0x16c0 fs/ioctl.c:810
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:868 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x10c/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#23);
lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#23);
rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor.4/7658:
#0: ffff8880865b1a10 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#23){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:771 [inline]
#0: ffff8880865b1a10 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#23){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_fiemap+0x1e3/0x1670 fs/f2fs/data.c:1998
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 7658 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-next-20230621-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
check_noncircular+0x2df/0x3b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2e9d/0x5e20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
lock_acquire.part.0+0x11c/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
__might_fault mm/memory.c:5717 [inline]
__might_fault+0x115/0x190 mm/memory.c:5710
_copy_to_user+0x2b/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:36
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline]
fiemap_fill_next_extent+0x217/0x370 fs/ioctl.c:144
f2fs_fiemap+0x5a5/0x1670 fs/f2fs/data.c:2066
ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:219 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x478/0x16c0 fs/ioctl.c:810
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:868 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x10c/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f3f8028c389
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3f81084168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3f803abf80 RCX: 00007f3f8028c389
RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f3f802d7493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffe04349abf R14: 00007f3f81084300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
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