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Message-ID: <20230627120058.2214509-1-matteorizzo@google.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 12:00:57 +0000
From: Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@...gle.com>
To: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
io-uring@...r.kernel.org
Cc: matteorizzo@...gle.com, jordyzomer@...gle.com, evn@...gle.com,
poprdi@...gle.com, corbet@....net, axboe@...nel.dk,
asml.silence@...il.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
keescook@...omium.org, rostedt@...dmis.org,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, ribalda@...omium.org,
chenhuacai@...nel.org, steve@....org, gpiccoli@...lia.com,
ldufour@...ux.ibm.com
Subject: [PATCH 0/1] Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in
io_uring (https://goo.gle/limit-iouring) which could be exploited by
an unprivileged process. There is currently no way to disable io_uring
system-wide except by compiling it out of the kernel entirely. The only
way to prevent a process from accessing io_uring is to use a seccomp
filter, but seccomp cannot be applied system-wide. This patch introduces a
new sysctl which disables the creation of new io_uring instances
system-wide. This gives system admins a way to reduce the kernel's attack
surface on systems where io_uring is not used.
Matteo Rizzo (1):
Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 14 ++++++++++++
io_uring/io_uring.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
--
2.41.0.162.gfafddb0af9-goog
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