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Date:   Thu, 29 Jun 2023 03:19:29 +0000
From:   "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>
To:     "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "nik.borisov@...e.com" <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC:     "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
        "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "david@...hat.com" <david@...hat.com>,
        "bagasdotme@...il.com" <bagasdotme@...il.com>,
        "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        "ak@...ux.intel.com" <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Wysocki, Rafael J" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
        "kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Christopherson,, Sean" <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>,
        "Chatre, Reinette" <reinette.chatre@...el.com>,
        "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "Shahar, Sagi" <sagis@...gle.com>,
        "imammedo@...hat.com" <imammedo@...hat.com>,
        "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>, "Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@...el.com>,
        "Brown, Len" <len.brown@...el.com>,
        "sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com" 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@...el.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 19/22] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on
 platforms with TDX erratum

On Wed, 2023-06-28 at 12:20 +0300, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
> > +	atomic_inc_return(&tdx_may_has_private_mem);
> > +
> >    	/* Config the key of global KeyID on all packages */
> >    	ret = config_global_keyid();
> >    	if (ret)
> > @@ -1154,6 +1167,15 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void)
> >    	 * as suggested by the TDX spec.
> >    	 */
> >    	tdmrs_reset_pamt_all(&tdx_tdmr_list);
> > +	/*
> > +	 * No more TDX private pages now, and PAMTs/TDMRs are
> > +	 * going to be freed.  Make this globally visible so
> > +	 * tdx_reset_memory() can read stable TDMRs/PAMTs.
> > +	 *
> > +	 * Note atomic_dec_return(), which is an atomic RMW with
> > +	 * return value, always enforces the memory barrier.
> > +	 */
> > +	atomic_dec_return(&tdx_may_has_private_mem);
> 
> Make a comment here which either refers to the comment at the increment 
> site.

I guess I got your point.  Will try to make better comments.

> 
> >    out_free_pamts:
> >    	tdmrs_free_pamt_all(&tdx_tdmr_list);
> >    out_free_tdmrs:
> > @@ -1229,6 +1251,63 @@ int tdx_enable(void)
> >    }
> >    EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_enable);
> >    
> > +/*
> > + * Convert TDX private pages back to normal on platforms with
> > + * "partial write machine check" erratum.
> > + *
> > + * Called from machine_kexec() before booting to the new kernel.
> > + */
> > +void tdx_reset_memory(void)
> > +{
> > +	if (!platform_tdx_enabled())
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Kernel read/write to TDX private memory doesn't
> > +	 * cause machine check on hardware w/o this erratum.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE))
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	/* Called from kexec() when only rebooting cpu is alive */
> > +	WARN_ON_ONCE(num_online_cpus() != 1);
> > +
> > +	if (!atomic_read(&tdx_may_has_private_mem))
> > +		return;
> 
> I think a comment is warranted here explicitly calling our the ordering 
> requirement/guarantees. Actually this is a non-rmw operation so it 
> doesn't have any bearing on the ordering/implicit mb's achieved at the 
> "increment" site.

We don't need explicit ordering/barrier here, if I am not missing something. 
The atomic_{inc/dec}_return() already made sure the memory ordering -- which
guarantees when @tdx_may_has_private_mem reads true _here_, the TDMRs/PAMTs must
be stable.

Quoted from Documentation/atomic_t.txt:

"
 - RMW operations that have a return value are fully ordered;   

 ...

Fully ordered primitives are ordered against everything prior and everything   
subsequent. Therefore a fully ordered primitive is like having an smp_mb()     
before and an smp_mb() after the primitive.
"


Am I missing anything? 

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