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Message-ID: <CACw3F53p8szcxv7PSOSqN6ps3hHmRD4VQor3pLd0Cqrn-p2Ajw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2023 11:17:57 -0700
From: Jiaqi Yan <jiaqiyan@...gle.com>
To: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@...gle.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Huang Ying <ying.huang@...el.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
James Houghton <jthoughton@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>,
Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@...wei.com>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@...nel.org>,
Muchun Song <muchun.song@...ux.dev>,
Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>,
Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@....com>,
Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@...wei.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] mm: userfaultfd: add new UFFDIO_POISON ioctl
On Thu, Jun 29, 2023 at 1:50 PM Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> The basic idea here is to "simulate" memory poisoning for VMs. A VM
> running on some host might encounter a memory error, after which some
> page(s) are poisoned (i.e., future accesses SIGBUS). They expect that
> once poisoned, pages can never become "un-poisoned". So, when we live
> migrate the VM, we need to preserve the poisoned status of these pages.
>
> When live migrating, we try to get the guest running on its new host as
> quickly as possible. So, we start it running before all memory has been
> copied, and before we're certain which pages should be poisoned or not.
>
> So the basic way to use this new feature is:
>
> - On the new host, the guest's memory is registered with userfaultfd, in
> either MISSING or MINOR mode (doesn't really matter for this purpose).
> - On any first access, we get a userfaultfd event. At this point we can
> communicate with the old host to find out if the page was poisoned.
> - If so, we can respond with a UFFDIO_POISON - this places a swap marker
> so any future accesses will SIGBUS. Because the pte is now "present",
> future accesses won't generate more userfaultfd events, they'll just
> SIGBUS directly.
>
> UFFDIO_POISON does not handle unmapping previously-present PTEs. This
A minor suggestion, would UFFDIO_HWPOISON be better? so that readers
won't be confused with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING (a feature to fill the
pages with poison patterns after free).
> isn't needed, because during live migration we want to intercept
> all accesses with userfaultfd (not just writes, so WP mode isn't useful
> for this). So whether minor or missing mode is being used (or both), the
> PTE won't be present in any case, so handling that case isn't needed.
>
> Why return VM_FAULT_HWPOISON instead of VM_FAULT_SIGBUS when one of
> these markers is encountered? For "normal" userspace programs there
> isn't a big difference, both yield a SIGBUS. The difference for KVM is
> key though: VM_FAULT_HWPOISON will result in an MCE being injected into
> the guest (which is the behavior we want). With VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, the
> hypervisor would need to catch the SIGBUS and deal with the MCE
> injection itself.
>
> Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@...gle.com>
> ---
> fs/userfaultfd.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/swapops.h | 3 +-
> include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 4 ++
> include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 25 +++++++++++--
> mm/memory.c | 4 ++
> mm/userfaultfd.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 6 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> index 7cecd49e078b..c26a883399c9 100644
> --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
> +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> @@ -1965,6 +1965,66 @@ static int userfaultfd_continue(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, unsigned long arg)
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static inline int userfaultfd_poison(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, unsigned long arg)
> +{
> + __s64 ret;
> + struct uffdio_poison uffdio_poison;
> + struct uffdio_poison __user *user_uffdio_poison;
> + struct userfaultfd_wake_range range;
> +
> + user_uffdio_poison = (struct uffdio_poison __user *)arg;
> +
> + ret = -EAGAIN;
> + if (atomic_read(&ctx->mmap_changing))
> + goto out;
> +
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + if (copy_from_user(&uffdio_poison, user_uffdio_poison,
> + /* don't copy the output fields */
> + sizeof(uffdio_poison) - (sizeof(__s64))))
> + goto out;
> +
> + ret = validate_range(ctx->mm, uffdio_poison.range.start,
> + uffdio_poison.range.len);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + /* double check for wraparound just in case. */
> + if (uffdio_poison.range.start + uffdio_poison.range.len <=
> + uffdio_poison.range.start) {
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (uffdio_poison.mode & ~UFFDIO_POISON_MODE_DONTWAKE)
> + goto out;
> +
> + if (mmget_not_zero(ctx->mm)) {
> + ret = mfill_atomic_poison(ctx->mm, uffdio_poison.range.start,
> + uffdio_poison.range.len,
> + &ctx->mmap_changing, 0);
> + mmput(ctx->mm);
> + } else {
> + return -ESRCH;
> + }
> +
> + if (unlikely(put_user(ret, &user_uffdio_poison->updated)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto out;
> +
> + /* len == 0 would wake all */
> + BUG_ON(!ret);
> + range.len = ret;
> + if (!(uffdio_poison.mode & UFFDIO_POISON_MODE_DONTWAKE)) {
> + range.start = uffdio_poison.range.start;
> + wake_userfault(ctx, &range);
> + }
> + ret = range.len == uffdio_poison.range.len ? 0 : -EAGAIN;
> +
> +out:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static inline unsigned int uffd_ctx_features(__u64 user_features)
> {
> /*
> @@ -2066,6 +2126,9 @@ static long userfaultfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
> case UFFDIO_CONTINUE:
> ret = userfaultfd_continue(ctx, arg);
> break;
> + case UFFDIO_POISON:
> + ret = userfaultfd_poison(ctx, arg);
> + break;
> }
> return ret;
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/swapops.h b/include/linux/swapops.h
> index 4c932cb45e0b..8259fee32421 100644
> --- a/include/linux/swapops.h
> +++ b/include/linux/swapops.h
> @@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ typedef unsigned long pte_marker;
>
> #define PTE_MARKER_UFFD_WP BIT(0)
> #define PTE_MARKER_SWAPIN_ERROR BIT(1)
> -#define PTE_MARKER_MASK (BIT(2) - 1)
> +#define PTE_MARKER_UFFD_POISON BIT(2)
> +#define PTE_MARKER_MASK (BIT(3) - 1)
>
> static inline swp_entry_t make_pte_marker_entry(pte_marker marker)
> {
> diff --git a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
> index ac7b0c96d351..ac8c6854097c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
> +++ b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
> @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ enum mfill_atomic_mode {
> MFILL_ATOMIC_COPY,
> MFILL_ATOMIC_ZEROPAGE,
> MFILL_ATOMIC_CONTINUE,
> + MFILL_ATOMIC_POISON,
> NR_MFILL_ATOMIC_MODES,
> };
>
> @@ -83,6 +84,9 @@ extern ssize_t mfill_atomic_zeropage(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
> extern ssize_t mfill_atomic_continue(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start,
> unsigned long len, atomic_t *mmap_changing,
> uffd_flags_t flags);
> +extern ssize_t mfill_atomic_poison(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long start,
> + unsigned long len, atomic_t *mmap_changing,
> + uffd_flags_t flags);
> extern int mwriteprotect_range(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
> unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
> bool enable_wp, atomic_t *mmap_changing);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
> index 66dd4cd277bd..62151706c5a3 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
> @@ -39,7 +39,8 @@
> UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_SHMEM | \
> UFFD_FEATURE_EXACT_ADDRESS | \
> UFFD_FEATURE_WP_HUGETLBFS_SHMEM | \
> - UFFD_FEATURE_WP_UNPOPULATED)
> + UFFD_FEATURE_WP_UNPOPULATED | \
> + UFFD_FEATURE_POISON)
> #define UFFD_API_IOCTLS \
> ((__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_REGISTER | \
> (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_UNREGISTER | \
> @@ -49,12 +50,14 @@
> (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_COPY | \
> (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE | \
> (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT | \
> - (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_CONTINUE)
> + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_CONTINUE | \
> + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_POISON)
> #define UFFD_API_RANGE_IOCTLS_BASIC \
> ((__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WAKE | \
> (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_COPY | \
> + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT | \
> (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_CONTINUE | \
> - (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT)
> + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_POISON)
>
> /*
> * Valid ioctl command number range with this API is from 0x00 to
> @@ -71,6 +74,7 @@
> #define _UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE (0x04)
> #define _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT (0x06)
> #define _UFFDIO_CONTINUE (0x07)
> +#define _UFFDIO_POISON (0x08)
> #define _UFFDIO_API (0x3F)
>
> /* userfaultfd ioctl ids */
> @@ -91,6 +95,8 @@
> struct uffdio_writeprotect)
> #define UFFDIO_CONTINUE _IOWR(UFFDIO, _UFFDIO_CONTINUE, \
> struct uffdio_continue)
> +#define UFFDIO_POISON _IOWR(UFFDIO, _UFFDIO_POISON, \
> + struct uffdio_poison)
>
> /* read() structure */
> struct uffd_msg {
> @@ -225,6 +231,7 @@ struct uffdio_api {
> #define UFFD_FEATURE_EXACT_ADDRESS (1<<11)
> #define UFFD_FEATURE_WP_HUGETLBFS_SHMEM (1<<12)
> #define UFFD_FEATURE_WP_UNPOPULATED (1<<13)
> +#define UFFD_FEATURE_POISON (1<<14)
> __u64 features;
>
> __u64 ioctls;
> @@ -321,6 +328,18 @@ struct uffdio_continue {
> __s64 mapped;
> };
>
> +struct uffdio_poison {
> + struct uffdio_range range;
> +#define UFFDIO_POISON_MODE_DONTWAKE ((__u64)1<<0)
> + __u64 mode;
> +
> + /*
> + * Fields below here are written by the ioctl and must be at the end:
> + * the copy_from_user will not read past here.
> + */
> + __s64 updated;
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Flags for the userfaultfd(2) system call itself.
> */
> diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
> index d8a9a770b1f1..7fbda39e060d 100644
> --- a/mm/memory.c
> +++ b/mm/memory.c
> @@ -3692,6 +3692,10 @@ static vm_fault_t handle_pte_marker(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!marker))
> return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
>
> + /* Poison emulation explicitly requested for this PTE. */
> + if (marker & PTE_MARKER_UFFD_POISON)
> + return VM_FAULT_HWPOISON;
> +
> /* Higher priority than uffd-wp when data corrupted */
> if (marker & PTE_MARKER_SWAPIN_ERROR)
> return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
> diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c
> index a2bf37ee276d..87b62ca1e09e 100644
> --- a/mm/userfaultfd.c
> +++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c
> @@ -286,6 +286,51 @@ static int mfill_atomic_pte_continue(pmd_t *dst_pmd,
> goto out;
> }
>
> +/* Handles UFFDIO_POISON for all non-hugetlb VMAs. */
> +static int mfill_atomic_pte_poison(pmd_t *dst_pmd,
> + struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
> + unsigned long dst_addr,
> + uffd_flags_t flags)
> +{
> + int ret;
> + struct mm_struct *dst_mm = dst_vma->vm_mm;
> + pte_t _dst_pte, *dst_pte;
> + spinlock_t *ptl;
> +
> + _dst_pte = make_pte_marker(PTE_MARKER_UFFD_POISON);
> + dst_pte = pte_offset_map_lock(dst_mm, dst_pmd, dst_addr, &ptl);
> +
> + if (vma_is_shmem(dst_vma)) {
> + struct inode *inode;
> + pgoff_t offset, max_off;
> +
> + /* serialize against truncate with the page table lock */
> + inode = dst_vma->vm_file->f_inode;
> + offset = linear_page_index(dst_vma, dst_addr);
> + max_off = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE);
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + if (unlikely(offset >= max_off))
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> +
> + ret = -EEXIST;
> + /*
> + * For now, we don't handle unmapping pages, so only support filling in
> + * none PTEs, or replacing PTE markers.
> + */
> + if (!pte_none_mostly(*dst_pte))
> + goto out_unlock;
> +
> + set_pte_at(dst_mm, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte);
> +
> + /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
> + update_mmu_cache(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte);
> + ret = 0;
> +out_unlock:
> + pte_unmap_unlock(dst_pte, ptl);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static pmd_t *mm_alloc_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
> {
> pgd_t *pgd;
> @@ -336,8 +381,12 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic_hugetlb(
> * supported by hugetlb. A PMD_SIZE huge pages may exist as used
> * by THP. Since we can not reliably insert a zero page, this
> * feature is not supported.
> + *
> + * PTE marker handling for hugetlb is a bit special, so for now
> + * UFFDIO_POISON is not supported.
> */
> - if (uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_ZEROPAGE)) {
> + if (uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_ZEROPAGE) ||
> + uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_POISON)) {
> mmap_read_unlock(dst_mm);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> @@ -481,6 +530,9 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic_pte(pmd_t *dst_pmd,
> if (uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_CONTINUE)) {
> return mfill_atomic_pte_continue(dst_pmd, dst_vma,
> dst_addr, flags);
> + } else if (uffd_flags_mode_is(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_POISON)) {
> + return mfill_atomic_pte_poison(dst_pmd, dst_vma,
> + dst_addr, flags);
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -702,6 +754,14 @@ ssize_t mfill_atomic_continue(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long start,
> uffd_flags_set_mode(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_CONTINUE));
> }
>
> +ssize_t mfill_atomic_poison(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long start,
> + unsigned long len, atomic_t *mmap_changing,
> + uffd_flags_t flags)
> +{
> + return mfill_atomic(dst_mm, start, 0, len, mmap_changing,
> + uffd_flags_set_mode(flags, MFILL_ATOMIC_POISON));
> +}
> +
> long uffd_wp_range(struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
> unsigned long start, unsigned long len, bool enable_wp)
> {
> --
> 2.41.0.255.g8b1d071c50-goog
>
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