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Message-ID: <b948ba7d-74f0-30e5-c4d2-4a4d83866d37@suse.com>
Date:   Wed, 5 Jul 2023 06:46:54 +0200
From:   Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
To:     Oleksandr Tyshchenko <olekstysh@...il.com>,
        Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@...rix.com>,
        Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
        Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 
        <marmarek@...isiblethingslab.com>
Cc:     Oleksandr Tyshchenko <Oleksandr_Tyshchenko@...m.com>,
        Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@...e.com>,
        "xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        vikram.garhwal@....com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] xen/virtio: Avoid use of the dom0 backend in dom0

On 04.07.23 19:14, Oleksandr Tyshchenko wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jul 4, 2023 at 5:49 PM Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@...rix.com 
> <mailto:roger.pau@...rix.com>> wrote:
> 
> Hello all.
> 
> [sorry for the possible format issues]
> 
> 
>     On Tue, Jul 04, 2023 at 01:43:46PM +0200, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
>      > Hi,
>      >
>      > FWIW, I have ran into this issue some time ago too. I run Xen on top of
>      > KVM and then passthrough some of the virtio devices (network one
>      > specifically) into a (PV) guest. So, I hit both cases, the dom0 one and
>      > domU one. As a temporary workaround I needed to disable
>      > CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO completely (just disabling
>      > CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT was not enough to fix it).
>      > With that context in place, the actual response below.
>      >
>      > On Tue, Jul 04, 2023 at 12:39:40PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
>      > > On 04.07.23 09:48, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
>      > > > On Thu, Jun 29, 2023 at 03:44:04PM -0700, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
>      > > > > On Thu, 29 Jun 2023, Oleksandr Tyshchenko wrote:
>      > > > > > On 29.06.23 04:00, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
>      > > > > > > I think we need to add a second way? It could be anything that
>     can help
>      > > > > > > us distinguish between a non-grants-capable virtio backend and a
>      > > > > > > grants-capable virtio backend, such as:
>      > > > > > > - a string on xenstore
>      > > > > > > - a xen param
>      > > > > > > - a special PCI configuration register value
>      > > > > > > - something in the ACPI tables
>      > > > > > > - the QEMU machine type
>      > > > > >
>      > > > > >
>      > > > > > Yes, I remember there was a discussion regarding that. The point
>     is to
>      > > > > > choose a solution to be functional for both PV and HVM *and* to
>     be able
>      > > > > > to support a hotplug. IIRC, the xenstore could be a possible
>     candidate.
>      > > > >
>      > > > > xenstore would be among the easiest to make work. The only downside is
>      > > > > the dependency on xenstore which otherwise virtio+grants doesn't have.
>      > > >
>      > > > I would avoid introducing a dependency on xenstore, if nothing else we
>      > > > know it's a performance bottleneck.
>      > > >
>      > > > We would also need to map the virtio device topology into xenstore, so
>      > > > that we can pass different options for each device.
>      > >
>      > > This aspect (different options) is important. How do you want to pass
>     virtio
>      > > device configuration parameters from dom0 to the virtio backend domain? You
>      > > probably need something like Xenstore (a virtio based alternative like
>     virtiofs
>      > > would work, too) for that purpose.
>      > >
>      > > Mapping the topology should be rather easy via the PCI-Id, e.g.:
>      > >
>      > > /local/domain/42/device/virtio/0000:00:1c.0/backend
>      >
>      > While I agree this would probably be the simplest to implement, I don't
>      > like introducing xenstore dependency into virtio frontend either.
>      > Toolstack -> backend communication is probably easier to solve, as it's
>      > much more flexible (could use qemu cmdline, QMP, other similar
>      > mechanisms for non-qemu backends etc).
> 
>     I also think features should be exposed uniformly for devices, it's at
>     least weird to have certain features exposed in the PCI config space
>     while other features exposed in xenstore.
> 
>     For virtio-mmio this might get a bit confusing, are we going to add
>     xenstore entries based on the position of the device config mmio
>     region?
> 
>     I think on Arm PCI enumeration is not (usually?) done by the firmware,
>     at which point the SBDF expected by the tools/backend might be
>     different than the value assigned by the guest OS.
> 
>     I think there are two slightly different issues, one is how to pass
>     information to virtio backends, I think doing this initially based on
>     xenstore is not that bad, because it's an internal detail of the
>     backend implementation. However passing information to virtio
>     frontends using xenstore is IMO a bad idea, there's already a way to
>     negotiate features between virtio frontends and backends, and Xen
>     should just expand and use that.
> 
> 
> 
> On Arm with device-tree we have a special bindings which purpose is to inform us 
> whether we need to use grants for virtio and backend domid for a particular 
> device.Here on x86, we don't have a device tree, so cannot (easily?) reuse this 
> logic.
> 
> I have just recollected one idea suggested by Stefano some time ago [1]. The 
> context of discussion was about what to do when device-tree and ACPI cannot be 
> reused (or something like that).The idea won't cover virtio-mmio, but I have 
> heard that virtio-mmio usage with x86 Xen is rather unusual case.
> 
> I will paste the text below for convenience.
> 
> **********
> 
> Part 1 (intro):
> 
> We could reuse a PCI config space register to expose the backend id.
> However this solution requires a backend change (QEMU) to expose the
> backend id via an emulated register for each emulated device.
> 
> To avoid having to introduce a special config space register in all
> emulated PCI devices (virtio-net, virtio-block, etc) I wonder if we
> could add a special PCI config space register at the emulated PCI Root
> Complex level.
> 
> Basically the workflow would be as follow:
> 
> - Linux recognizes the PCI Root Complex as a Xen PCI Root Complex
> - Linux writes to special PCI config space register of the Xen PCI Root
>    Complex the PCI device id (basically the BDF)
> - The Xen PCI Root Complex emulated by Xen answers by writing back to
>    the same location the backend id (domid of the backend)
> - Linux reads back the same PCI config space register of the Xen PCI
>    Root Complex and learn the relevant domid
> 
> Part 2 (clarification):
> 
> I think using a special config space register in the root complex would
> not be terrible in terms of guest changes because it is easy to
> introduce a new root complex driver in Linux and other OSes. The root
> complex would still be ECAM compatible so the regular ECAM driver would
> still work. A new driver would only be necessary if you want to be able
> to access the special config space register.
> 
> 
> **********
> What do you think about it? Are there any pitfalls, etc? This also requires 
> system changes, but at least without virtio spec changes.
> 
> [1] 
> https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/alpine.DEB.2.22.394.2210061747590.3690179@ubuntu-linux-20-04-desktop/ <https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/alpine.DEB.2.22.394.2210061747590.3690179@ubuntu-linux-20-04-desktop/>

Sounds like a good idea. There would be one PCI root per backend domain needed,
but that should be possible.


Juergen


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