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Message-ID: <5070f3eb-55e2-44db-a97d-41f9b9878c6d@moroto.mountain>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 08:52:39 +0300
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] smackfs: Prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()
There is a upper bound to "catlen" but no lower bound to prevent
negatives. I don't see that this necessarily causes a problem but we
may as well be safe.
Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
---
security/smack/smackfs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 5590eaad241b..25f67d1b5c73 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
}
ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &catlen);
- if (ret != 1 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
+ if (ret != 1 || catlen < 0 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
goto out;
if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT &&
--
2.39.2
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