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Message-ID: <20230706120103.GJ2833176@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 14:01:03 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Henry Wu <triangletrap12@...il.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: Possible race in rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain
On Thu, Jul 06, 2023 at 02:08:20PM +0800, Henry Wu wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I found that it's not safe to change waiter->prio after waiter
> dequeued from mutex's waiter rbtree because it's still on owner's
> pi_waiters rbtree. From my analysis, waiters on pi_waiters rbtree
> should be protected by pi_lock of task which have pi_waiters and
> corresponding rt_mutex's wait_lock, but pi_waiters is shared by many
> locks owned by this task, so actually we serialize changes on
> pi_waiters only by pi_lock.
>
> `rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain' changes key of nodes of pi_waiters rbtree
> without pi_lock and pi_waiters rbtree's invariant is violated. Maybe
> we are enqueuing waiter on other cpu and pi_waiters rbtree will be
> corrupted.
Are you talking about [7];
Where we do waiter_update_prio() while only
holding [L] rtmutex->wait_lock.
VS
rt_mutex_adjust_prio() / task_top_pi_waiter() that accesses ->pi_waiters
while holding [P] task->pi_lock.
?
I'll go stare at that in more detail -- but I wanted to verify that's
what you're talking about.
> I attach a source file which can trigger this violation. I tested it
> on Ubuntu 20.04 LTS with 5.4 kernel.
Well, that's a horribly old kernel :-( Please double check on v6.4 and
consult that code for the discussion above -- I'm really not too
interested in debugging something ancient.
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