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Message-Id: <168910866387.217585.15007808058378960214.b4-ty@kernel.dk>
Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2023 14:51:03 -0600
From: Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
To: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
io-uring@...r.kernel.org, asml.silence@...il.com,
Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@...gle.com>
Cc: corbet@....net, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, keescook@...omium.org,
ribalda@...omium.org, rostedt@...dmis.org, jannh@...gle.com,
chenhuacai@...nel.org, gpiccoli@...lia.com, ldufour@...ux.ibm.com,
evn@...gle.com, poprdi@...gle.com, jordyzomer@...gle.com,
jmoyer@...hat.com, krisman@...e.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/1] Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
On Fri, 30 Jun 2023 15:10:02 +0000, Matteo Rizzo wrote:
> Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in
> io_uring[1] which could be exploited by an unprivileged process to gain
> control over the kernel. This patch introduces a new sysctl which disables
> the creation of new io_uring instances system-wide.
>
> The goal of this patch is to give distros, system admins, and cloud
> providers a way to reduce the risk of privilege escalation through io_uring
> where disabling it with seccomp or at compile time is not practical. For
> example a distro or cloud provider might want to disable io_uring by
> default and have users enable it again if they need to run a program that
> requires it. The new sysctl is designed to let a user with root on the
> machine enable and disable io_uring systemwide at runtime without requiring
> a kernel recompilation or a reboot.
>
> [...]
Applied, thanks!
[1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
commit: d55f54dac19a0cee1818353ab5aa3edac9034db4
Best regards,
--
Jens Axboe
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