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Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2023 21:33:11 +0900
From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@...nel.org>
To: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@...e.com>
Cc: tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, hpa@...or.com, peterz@...radead.org,
samitolvanen@...gle.com, x86@...nel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/retpoline,kprobes: Skip optprobe check for
indirect jumps with retpolines and IBT
On Tue, 11 Jul 2023 11:19:52 +0200
Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@...e.com> wrote:
> The kprobes optimization check can_optimize() calls
> insn_is_indirect_jump() to detect indirect jump instructions in
> a target function. If any is found, creating an optprobe is disallowed
> in the function because the jump could be from a jump table and could
> potentially land in the middle of the target optprobe.
>
> With retpolines, insn_is_indirect_jump() additionally looks for calls to
> indirect thunks which the compiler potentially used to replace original
> jumps. This extra check is however unnecessary because jump tables are
> disabled when the kernel is built with retpolines. The same is currently
> the case with IBT.
>
> Based on this observation, remove the logic to look for calls to
> indirect thunks and skip the check for indirect jumps altogether if the
> kernel is built with retpolines or IBT. Remove subsequently the symbols
> __indirect_thunk_start and __indirect_thunk_end which are no longer
> needed.
>
> Dropping this logic indirectly fixes a problem where the range
> [__indirect_thunk_start, __indirect_thunk_end] wrongly included also the
> return thunk. It caused that machines which used the return thunk as
> a mitigation and didn't have it patched by any alternative ended up not
> being able to use optprobes in any regular function.
This looks good to me.
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Thanks!
>
> Fixes: 0b53c374b9ef ("x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return")
> Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
> Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@...nel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@...e.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 ---
> arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 40 +++++++++++-----------------
> arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 --
> tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c | 4 +--
> 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> index 55388c9f7601..c5460be93fa7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> @@ -461,9 +461,6 @@ enum ssb_mitigation {
> SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
> };
>
> -extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
> -extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
> -
> static __always_inline
> void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
> index 57b0037d0a99..517821b48391 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
> @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int copy_optimized_instructions(u8 *dest, u8 *src, u8 *real)
> }
>
> /* Check whether insn is indirect jump */
> -static int __insn_is_indirect_jump(struct insn *insn)
> +static int insn_is_indirect_jump(struct insn *insn)
> {
> return ((insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0xff &&
> (X86_MODRM_REG(insn->modrm.value) & 6) == 4) || /* Jump */
> @@ -260,26 +260,6 @@ static int insn_jump_into_range(struct insn *insn, unsigned long start, int len)
> return (start <= target && target <= start + len);
> }
>
> -static int insn_is_indirect_jump(struct insn *insn)
> -{
> - int ret = __insn_is_indirect_jump(insn);
> -
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> - /*
> - * Jump to x86_indirect_thunk_* is treated as an indirect jump.
> - * Note that even with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, the kernel compiled with
> - * older gcc may use indirect jump. So we add this check instead of
> - * replace indirect-jump check.
> - */
> - if (!ret)
> - ret = insn_jump_into_range(insn,
> - (unsigned long)__indirect_thunk_start,
> - (unsigned long)__indirect_thunk_end -
> - (unsigned long)__indirect_thunk_start);
> -#endif
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> /* Decode whole function to ensure any instructions don't jump into target */
> static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr)
> {
> @@ -334,9 +314,21 @@ static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr)
> /* Recover address */
> insn.kaddr = (void *)addr;
> insn.next_byte = (void *)(addr + insn.length);
> - /* Check any instructions don't jump into target */
> - if (insn_is_indirect_jump(&insn) ||
> - insn_jump_into_range(&insn, paddr + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
> + /*
> + * Check any instructions don't jump into target, indirectly or
> + * directly.
> + *
> + * The indirect case is present to handle a code with jump
> + * tables. When the kernel uses retpolines, the check should in
> + * theory additionally look for jumps to indirect thunks.
> + * However, the kernel built with retpolines or IBT has jump
> + * tables disabled so the check can be skipped altogether.
> + */
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
> + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) &&
> + insn_is_indirect_jump(&insn))
> + return 0;
> + if (insn_jump_into_range(&insn, paddr + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
> DISP32_SIZE))
> return 0;
> addr += insn.length;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> index a4cd04c458df..dd5b0a68cf84 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> @@ -133,9 +133,7 @@ SECTIONS
> KPROBES_TEXT
> SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
> #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> - __indirect_thunk_start = .;
> *(.text..__x86.*)
> - __indirect_thunk_end = .;
> #endif
> STATIC_CALL_TEXT
>
> diff --git a/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c b/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
> index 374d142e7390..c6a0a27b12c2 100644
> --- a/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
> +++ b/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
> @@ -1038,9 +1038,7 @@ static int thread_stack__trace_end(struct thread_stack *ts,
>
> static bool is_x86_retpoline(const char *name)
> {
> - const char *p = strstr(name, "__x86_indirect_thunk_");
> -
> - return p == name || !strcmp(name, "__indirect_thunk_start");
> + return strstr(name, "__x86_indirect_thunk_") == name;
> }
>
> /*
> --
> 2.35.3
>
--
Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@...nel.org>
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