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Message-ID: <20230712175711.1431adec@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 17:57:11 -0700
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To: pinkperfect <pinkperfect2021@...il.com>
Cc: amitkarwar@...il.com, ganapathi017@...il.com,
huxinming820@...il.com, kvalo@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
sharvari.harisangam@....com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow in
mwifiex_process_mgmt_packet
On Mon, 10 Jul 2023 15:01:30 +0000 pinkperfect wrote:
> Hi, this vulnerability has been reported to and discussed with chromeos teams,
> the detail analysis, see comments in below code:
> mwifiex_process_sta_rx_packet makes sure rx_pkt_offset + rx_pkt_length <= skb->len
> In mwifiex_process_mgmt_packet:
>
> rx_pd = (struct rxpd *)skb->data;
>
> // skb->len -= rx_pkt_offset, skb->len == rx_pkt_length
> skb_pull(skb, le16_to_cpu(rx_pd->rx_pkt_offset));
> // skb->len == rx_pkt_length - 2, if set rx_pkt_length == 4, skb->len == 2
> skb_pull(skb, sizeof(pkt_len));
>
> pkt_len = le16_to_cpu(rx_pd->rx_pkt_length);
>
> //skip..
>
> // now skb->len == 2, skb->data + 24 is oob from skb buffer
> // skb->data + 30 is oob from skb buffer
> // pkt_len == 4, so underflow
> memmove(skb->data + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr),
> skb->data + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr),
> pkt_len - sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr));
>
> On MT8173 chromebook, the arm64 memmove.S / memcpy.S code logical
> cause memove(dst, src, -x) a possible exploitable oob write vulnerability
> not only a unexploitable crash
Oh, didn't see the v2, please address the comments I just sent to v1.
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