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Message-ID: <ZK/vj5qnkaeBt6cR@1wt.eu>
Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2023 14:35:27 +0200
From: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
To: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Dave Chinner <dchinner@...hat.com>,
xu xin <cgel.zte@...il.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Stefan Roesch <shr@...kernel.io>,
Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@...wei.com>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>,
Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Weißschuh <thomas@...ch.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] procfs: block chmod on /proc/thread-self/comm
+Cc Thomas Weißschuh <thomas@...ch.de> as this seems quite related to
his finding about /proc/self/net:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230624-proc-net-setattr-v1-0-73176812adee@weissschuh.net/#b
On Thu, Jul 13, 2023 at 10:19:04PM +1000, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
> Due to an oversight in commit 1b3044e39a89 ("procfs: fix pthread
> cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE") in switching from REG to NOD,
> chmod operations on /proc/thread-self/comm were no longer blocked as
> they are on almost all other procfs files.
>
> A very similar situation with /proc/self/environ was used to as a root
> exploit a long time ago, but procfs has SB_I_NOEXEC so this is simply a
> correctness issue.
>
> Ref: https://lwn.net/Articles/191954/
> Ref: 6d76fa58b050 ("Don't allow chmod() on the /proc/<pid>/ files")
> Fixes: 1b3044e39a89 ("procfs: fix pthread cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # v4.7+
> Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++-
> tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c | 4 ++++
> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 05452c3b9872..7394229816f3 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -3583,7 +3583,8 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> }
>
> static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = {
> - .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission,
> + .setattr = proc_setattr,
> + .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission,
> };
>
> /*
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c
> index 486334981e60..08f0969208eb 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c
> @@ -580,6 +580,10 @@ int run_syscall(int min, int max)
> CASE_TEST(chmod_net); EXPECT_SYSZR(proc, chmod("/proc/self/net", 0555)); break;
> CASE_TEST(chmod_self); EXPECT_SYSER(proc, chmod("/proc/self", 0555), -1, EPERM); break;
> CASE_TEST(chown_self); EXPECT_SYSER(proc, chown("/proc/self", 0, 0), -1, EPERM); break;
> + CASE_TEST(chmod_self_comm); EXPECT_SYSER(proc, chmod("/proc/self/comm", 0777), -1, EPERM); break;
> + CASE_TEST(chmod_tid_comm); EXPECT_SYSER(proc, chmod("/proc/thread-self/comm", 0777), -1, EPERM); break;
> + CASE_TEST(chmod_self_environ);EXPECT_SYSER(proc, chmod("/proc/self/environ", 0777), -1, EPERM); break;
> + CASE_TEST(chmod_tid_environ); EXPECT_SYSER(proc, chmod("/proc/thread-self/environ", 0777), -1, EPERM); break;
> CASE_TEST(chroot_root); EXPECT_SYSZR(euid0, chroot("/")); break;
> CASE_TEST(chroot_blah); EXPECT_SYSER(1, chroot("/proc/self/blah"), -1, ENOENT); break;
> CASE_TEST(chroot_exe); EXPECT_SYSER(proc, chroot("/proc/self/exe"), -1, ENOTDIR); break;
> --
> 2.41.0
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