linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFC v9 08/51] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <396d0e29-defc-e207-2cbd-fe7137e798ad@intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 18 Jul 2023 16:17:11 -0700
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        jroedel@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com,
        ardb@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
        vkuznets@...hat.com, jmattson@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, slp@...hat.com, pgonda@...gle.com,
        peterz@...radead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com,
        rientjes@...gle.com, dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com,
        bp@...en8.de, vbabka@...e.cz, kirill@...temov.name,
        ak@...ux.intel.com, tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, alpergun@...gle.com,
        dgilbert@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org, ashish.kalra@....com,
        nikunj.dadhania@....com, liam.merwick@...cle.com,
        zhi.a.wang@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v9 08/51] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic
 IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled

On 7/18/23 15:34, Kim Phillips wrote:
...
> Automatic IBRS provides protection to [1]:
> 
>  - Processes running at CPL=0
>  - Processes running as host when Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) is enabled
> 
> i.e.,
> 
>     (CPL < 3) || ((ASID == 0) && SNP)
> 
> Because of this limitation, do not enable Automatic IBRS when SNP is
> enabled.

Gah, I found that hard to parse.  I think it's because you're talking
about an SEV-SNP host in one part and "SNP" in the other but _meaning_
SNP host and SNP guest.

Could I maybe suggest that you folks follow the TDX convention and
actually add _GUEST and _HOST to the feature name be explicit about
which side is which?

> Instead, fall back to retpolines.

Now I'm totally lost.

This is talking about falling back to retpolines ... in the kernel.  But
"Automatic IBRS provides protection to ... CPL < 3", aka. the kernel.

> Note that the AutoIBRS feature may continue to be used within the
> guest.

What is this trying to say?

"AutoIBRS can still be used in a guest since it protects CPL < 3"

or

"The AutoIBRS bits can still be twiddled within the guest even though it
doesn't do any good"

?

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> index 8cd4126d8253..311c0a6422b5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -1348,7 +1348,8 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct
> cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>       * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature
>       * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist.
>       */
> -    if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
> +    if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) || (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
> +        !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) {
>          setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
>          if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
>              !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))