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Message-ID: <20230719141918.543938-6-benno.lossin@proton.me>
Date:   Wed, 19 Jul 2023 14:20:43 +0000
From:   Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@...ton.me>
To:     Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>,
        Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@...il.com>,
        Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@...il.com>
Cc:     Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>, Gary Guo <gary@...yguo.net>,
        Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com>,
        Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@...ton.me>,
        Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@...gle.com>,
        Andreas Hindborg <nmi@...aspace.dk>,
        rust-for-linux@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 05/12] rust: init: make initializer values inaccessible after initializing

Previously the init macros would create a local variable with the name
and hygiene of the field that is being initialized to store the value of
the field. This would override any user defined variables. For example:
```
struct Foo {
    a: usize,
    b: usize,
}
let a = 10;
let foo = init!(Foo{
    a: a + 1, // This creates a local variable named `a`.
    b: a, // This refers to that variable!
});
let foo = Box::init!(foo)?;
assert_eq!(foo.a, 11);
assert_eq!(foo.b, 11);
```

This patch changes this behavior, so the above code would panic at the
last assertion, since `b` would have value 10.

Signed-off-by: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@...ton.me>
---
 rust/kernel/init/macros.rs | 20 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/rust/kernel/init/macros.rs b/rust/kernel/init/macros.rs
index 160b95fc03c9..5de939e0801f 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/init/macros.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/init/macros.rs
@@ -1073,13 +1073,13 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal {
         // In-place initialization syntax.
         @munch_fields($field:ident <- $val:expr, $($rest:tt)*),
     ) => {
-        let $field = $val;
+        let init = $val;
         // Call the initializer.
         //
         // SAFETY: `slot` is valid, because we are inside of an initializer closure, we
         // return when an error/panic occurs.
         // We also use the `data` to require the correct trait (`Init` or `PinInit`) for `$field`.
-        unsafe { $data.$field(::core::ptr::addr_of_mut!((*$slot).$field), $field)? };
+        unsafe { $data.$field(::core::ptr::addr_of_mut!((*$slot).$field), init)? };
         // Create the drop guard:
         //
         // We rely on macro hygiene to make it impossible for users to access this local variable.
@@ -1105,12 +1105,12 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal {
         // In-place initialization syntax.
         @munch_fields($field:ident <- $val:expr, $($rest:tt)*),
     ) => {
-        let $field = $val;
+        let init = $val;
         // Call the initializer.
         //
         // SAFETY: `slot` is valid, because we are inside of an initializer closure, we
         // return when an error/panic occurs.
-        unsafe { $crate::init::Init::__init($field, ::core::ptr::addr_of_mut!((*$slot).$field))? };
+        unsafe { $crate::init::Init::__init(init, ::core::ptr::addr_of_mut!((*$slot).$field))? };
         // Create the drop guard:
         //
         // We rely on macro hygiene to make it impossible for users to access this local variable.
@@ -1136,11 +1136,13 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal {
         // Init by-value.
         @munch_fields($field:ident $(: $val:expr)?, $($rest:tt)*),
     ) => {
-        $(let $field = $val;)?
-        // Initialize the field.
-        //
-        // SAFETY: The memory at `slot` is uninitialized.
-        unsafe { ::core::ptr::write(::core::ptr::addr_of_mut!((*$slot).$field), $field) };
+        {
+            $(let $field = $val;)?
+            // Initialize the field.
+            //
+            // SAFETY: The memory at `slot` is uninitialized.
+            unsafe { ::core::ptr::write(::core::ptr::addr_of_mut!((*$slot).$field), $field) };
+        }
         // Create the drop guard:
         //
         // We rely on macro hygiene to make it impossible for users to access this local variable.
-- 
2.41.0


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