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Message-Id: <CU76GKAGAGRG.22Y5TDTJ86WJR@suppilovahvero>
Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2023 20:32:23 +0300
From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: "Jo Van Bulck" <jo.vanbulck@...kuleuven.be>,
<linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] selftests/sgx: Harden test enclave API
On Wed Jul 19, 2023 at 5:24 PM EEST, Jo Van Bulck wrote:
> Adhere to enclave programming best practices and prevent confused-deputy
> attacks on the test enclave by validating that untrusted pointer arguments
> do not fall inside the protected enclave range.
>
> Note that the test enclave deliberately allows arbitrary reads/writes in
> enclave memory through the get_from_addr/put_to_addr operations for
> explicit testing purposes. Hence, only allow remaining unchecked pointer
> dereferences in these functions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jo Van Bulck <jo.vanbulck@...kuleuven.be>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 5 +
> tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++------
> 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
> index bad963c79..8d60f8dcd 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
> @@ -355,6 +355,11 @@ TEST_F(enclave, poison_args)
> : "=m"(flags) : : );
> EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
> EXPECT_EQ(flags & 0x40400, 0);
> +
> + /* attempt API pointer poisoning */
> + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(self->encl.encl_base + self->encl.encl_size - 1, &self->run, false), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ((&self->run)->function, ERESUME);
> + EXPECT_EQ((&self->run)->exception_vector, 6 /* expect ud2 */);
> }
>
> /*
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
> index c0d639729..5531f5d48 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
> @@ -16,37 +16,55 @@ enum sgx_enclu_function {
> EMODPE = 0x6,
> };
>
> -static void do_encl_emodpe(void *_op)
> +uint64_t get_enclave_base(void);
> +uint64_t get_enclave_size(void);
> +
> +static int is_outside_enclave(void *addr, size_t len)
> {
> - struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
> - struct encl_op_emodpe *op = _op;
> + /* need cast since void pointer arithmetics are undefined in C */
> + size_t start = (size_t) addr;
> + size_t end = start + len - 1;
> + size_t enclave_end = get_enclave_base() + get_enclave_size();
>
> - secinfo.flags = op->flags;
> + /* check for integer overflow with untrusted length */
> + if (start > end)
> + return 0;
>
> - asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
> - :
> - : "a" (EMODPE),
> - "b" (&secinfo),
> - "c" (op->epc_addr));
> + return (start > enclave_end || end < get_enclave_base());
> }
>
> -static void do_encl_eaccept(void *_op)
> +static int is_inside_enclave(void *addr, size_t len)
> {
> - struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
> - struct encl_op_eaccept *op = _op;
> - int rax;
> + /* need cast since void pointer arithmetics are undefined in C */
> + size_t start = (size_t) addr;
> + size_t end = start + len - 1;
> + size_t enclave_end = get_enclave_base() + get_enclave_size();
>
> - secinfo.flags = op->flags;
> + /* check for integer overflow with untrusted length */
> + if (start > end)
> + return 0;
>
> - asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
> - : "=a" (rax)
> - : "a" (EACCEPT),
> - "b" (&secinfo),
> - "c" (op->epc_addr));
> -
> - op->ret = rax;
> + return (start >= get_enclave_base() && end <= enclave_end);
> }
>
> +#define PANIC() \
> + asm("ud2\n\t")
> +
> +#define SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(u_arg, t_cp) \
any reason not to use static inline function?
> + do { \
> + /* 1. check if the argument lies entirely outside */ \
> + if (!is_outside_enclave((void *)u_arg, sizeof(*t_cp))) \
> + PANIC(); \
> + /* 2. copy the argument inside to prevent TOCTOU */ \
> + memcpy(t_cp, u_arg, sizeof(*t_cp)); \
> + } while (0)
> +
> +#define ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(u_arg, size) \
"
> + do { \
> + if (!is_inside_enclave(((void *)(u_arg)), size)) \
> + PANIC(); \
> + } while (0)
> +
> static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n)
> {
> size_t i;
> @@ -67,18 +85,62 @@ static void *memset(void *dest, int c, size_t n)
> return dest;
> }
>
> +static void do_encl_emodpe(void *_op)
> +{
> + struct encl_op_emodpe op;
> + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
> +
> + SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
> + ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(op.epc_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + secinfo.flags = op.flags;
> +
> + asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
> + :
> + : "a" (EMODPE),
> + "b" (&secinfo),
> + "c" (op.epc_addr));
> +}
> +
> +static void do_encl_eaccept(void *_op)
> +{
> + struct encl_op_eaccept op;
> + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
> + int rax;
> +
> + SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
> + ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(op.epc_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + secinfo.flags = op.flags;
> +
> + asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
> + : "=a" (rax)
> + : "a" (EACCEPT),
> + "b" (&secinfo),
> + "c" (op.epc_addr));
> +
> + op.ret = rax;
> + memcpy(_op, &op, sizeof(op));
> +}
> +
> static void do_encl_init_tcs_page(void *_op)
> {
> - struct encl_op_init_tcs_page *op = _op;
> - void *tcs = (void *)op->tcs_page;
> + struct encl_op_init_tcs_page op;
> + void *tcs;
> uint32_t val_32;
>
> + SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
> + tcs = (void *)op.tcs_page;
> + ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(tcs, PAGE_SIZE);
> + ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(get_enclave_base() + op.ssa, PAGE_SIZE);
> + ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(get_enclave_base() + op.entry, 1);
> +
> memset(tcs, 0, 16); /* STATE and FLAGS */
> - memcpy(tcs + 16, &op->ssa, 8); /* OSSA */
> + memcpy(tcs + 16, &op.ssa, 8); /* OSSA */
> memset(tcs + 24, 0, 4); /* CSSA */
> val_32 = 1;
> memcpy(tcs + 28, &val_32, 4); /* NSSA */
> - memcpy(tcs + 32, &op->entry, 8); /* OENTRY */
> + memcpy(tcs + 32, &op.entry, 8); /* OENTRY */
> memset(tcs + 40, 0, 24); /* AEP, OFSBASE, OGSBASE */
> val_32 = 0xFFFFFFFF;
> memcpy(tcs + 64, &val_32, 4); /* FSLIMIT */
> @@ -86,32 +148,54 @@ static void do_encl_init_tcs_page(void *_op)
> memset(tcs + 72, 0, 4024); /* Reserved */
> }
>
> -static void do_encl_op_put_to_buf(void *op)
> +static void do_encl_op_put_to_buf(void *_op)
> {
> - struct encl_op_put_to_buf *op2 = op;
> + struct encl_op_get_from_buf op;
> +
> + SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
>
> - memcpy(&encl_buffer[0], &op2->value, 8);
> + memcpy(&encl_buffer[0], &op.value, 8);
> + memcpy(_op, &op, sizeof(op));
> }
>
> -static void do_encl_op_get_from_buf(void *op)
> +static void do_encl_op_get_from_buf(void *_op)
> {
> - struct encl_op_get_from_buf *op2 = op;
> + struct encl_op_get_from_buf op;
>
> - memcpy(&op2->value, &encl_buffer[0], 8);
> + SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
> +
> + memcpy(&op.value, &encl_buffer[0], 8);
> + memcpy(_op, &op, sizeof(op));
> }
>
> static void do_encl_op_put_to_addr(void *_op)
> {
> - struct encl_op_put_to_addr *op = _op;
> + struct encl_op_put_to_addr op;
> +
> + SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
>
> - memcpy((void *)op->addr, &op->value, 8);
> + /*
> + * NOTE: not checking is_outside_enclave(op.addr, 8) here
> + * deliberately allows arbitrary writes to enclave memory for
> + * testing purposes.
> + */
> + memcpy((void *)op.addr, &op.value, 8);
> + memcpy(_op, &op, sizeof(op));
> }
>
> static void do_encl_op_get_from_addr(void *_op)
> {
> - struct encl_op_get_from_addr *op = _op;
> + struct encl_op_get_from_addr op;
> +
> + SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
>
> - memcpy(&op->value, (void *)op->addr, 8);
> + /*
> + * NOTE: not checking is_outside_enclave(op.addr, 8) here
> + * deliberately allows arbitrary reads from enclave memory for
> + * testing purposes.
> + */
> + memcpy(&op.value, (void *)op.addr, 8);
> + memcpy(_op, &op, sizeof(op));
> }
>
> static void do_encl_op_nop(void *_op)
> @@ -131,9 +215,10 @@ void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi)
> do_encl_emodpe,
> do_encl_init_tcs_page,
> };
> + struct encl_op_header op;
>
> - struct encl_op_header *op = (struct encl_op_header *)rdi;
> + SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(rdi, &op);
>
> - if (op->type < ENCL_OP_MAX)
> - (*encl_op_array[op->type])(op);
> + if (op.type < ENCL_OP_MAX)
> + (*encl_op_array[op.type])(rdi);
> }
> --
> 2.34.1
BR, Jarkko
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