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Message-Id: <CU76GKAGAGRG.22Y5TDTJ86WJR@suppilovahvero>
Date:   Thu, 20 Jul 2023 20:32:23 +0300
From:   "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@...nel.org>
To:     "Jo Van Bulck" <jo.vanbulck@...kuleuven.be>,
        <linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc:     <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] selftests/sgx: Harden test enclave API

On Wed Jul 19, 2023 at 5:24 PM EEST, Jo Van Bulck wrote:
> Adhere to enclave programming best practices and prevent confused-deputy
> attacks on the test enclave by validating that untrusted pointer arguments
> do not fall inside the protected enclave range.
>
> Note that the test enclave deliberately allows arbitrary reads/writes in
> enclave memory through the get_from_addr/put_to_addr operations for
> explicit testing purposes. Hence, only allow remaining unchecked pointer
> dereferences in these functions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jo Van Bulck <jo.vanbulck@...kuleuven.be>
> ---
>  tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c      |   5 +
>  tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++------
>  2 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
> index bad963c79..8d60f8dcd 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
> @@ -355,6 +355,11 @@ TEST_F(enclave, poison_args)
>  	    : "=m"(flags) : : );
>  	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
>  	EXPECT_EQ(flags & 0x40400, 0);
> +
> +	/* attempt API pointer poisoning */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(self->encl.encl_base + self->encl.encl_size - 1, &self->run, false), 0);
> +	EXPECT_EQ((&self->run)->function, ERESUME);
> +	EXPECT_EQ((&self->run)->exception_vector, 6 /* expect ud2 */);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
> index c0d639729..5531f5d48 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
> @@ -16,37 +16,55 @@ enum sgx_enclu_function {
>  	EMODPE = 0x6,
>  };
>  
> -static void do_encl_emodpe(void *_op)
> +uint64_t get_enclave_base(void);
> +uint64_t get_enclave_size(void);
> +
> +static int is_outside_enclave(void *addr, size_t len)
>  {
> -	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
> -	struct encl_op_emodpe *op = _op;
> +	/* need cast since void pointer arithmetics are undefined in C */
> +	size_t start = (size_t) addr;
> +	size_t end = start + len - 1;
> +	size_t enclave_end = get_enclave_base() + get_enclave_size();
>  
> -	secinfo.flags = op->flags;
> +	/* check for integer overflow with untrusted length */
> +	if (start > end)
> +		return 0;
>  
> -	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
> -				:
> -				: "a" (EMODPE),
> -				  "b" (&secinfo),
> -				  "c" (op->epc_addr));
> +	return (start > enclave_end || end < get_enclave_base());
>  }
>  
> -static void do_encl_eaccept(void *_op)
> +static int is_inside_enclave(void *addr, size_t len)
>  {
> -	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
> -	struct encl_op_eaccept *op = _op;
> -	int rax;
> +	/* need cast since void pointer arithmetics are undefined in C */
> +	size_t start = (size_t) addr;
> +	size_t end = start + len - 1;
> +	size_t enclave_end = get_enclave_base() + get_enclave_size();
>  
> -	secinfo.flags = op->flags;
> +	/* check for integer overflow with untrusted length */
> +	if (start > end)
> +		return 0;
>  
> -	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
> -				: "=a" (rax)
> -				: "a" (EACCEPT),
> -				  "b" (&secinfo),
> -				  "c" (op->epc_addr));
> -
> -	op->ret = rax;
> +	return (start >= get_enclave_base() && end <= enclave_end);
>  }
>  
> +#define PANIC()								\
> +	asm("ud2\n\t")
> +
> +#define SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(u_arg, t_cp)					\

any reason not to use static inline function?

> +	do {								\
> +		/* 1. check if the argument lies entirely outside */	\
> +		if (!is_outside_enclave((void *)u_arg, sizeof(*t_cp)))	\
> +			PANIC();					\
> +		/* 2. copy the argument inside to prevent TOCTOU */	\
> +		memcpy(t_cp, u_arg, sizeof(*t_cp));			\
> +	} while (0)
> +
> +#define ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(u_arg, size)				\

"

> +	do {								\
> +		if (!is_inside_enclave(((void *)(u_arg)), size))	\
> +			PANIC();					\
> +	} while (0)
> +
>  static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n)
>  {
>  	size_t i;
> @@ -67,18 +85,62 @@ static void *memset(void *dest, int c, size_t n)
>  	return dest;
>  }
>  
> +static void do_encl_emodpe(void *_op)
> +{
> +	struct encl_op_emodpe op;
> +	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
> +
> +	SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
> +	ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(op.epc_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +	secinfo.flags = op.flags;
> +
> +	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
> +				:
> +				: "a" (EMODPE),
> +				  "b" (&secinfo),
> +				  "c" (op.epc_addr));
> +}
> +
> +static void do_encl_eaccept(void *_op)
> +{
> +	struct encl_op_eaccept op;
> +	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
> +	int rax;
> +
> +	SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
> +	ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(op.epc_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +	secinfo.flags = op.flags;
> +
> +	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
> +				: "=a" (rax)
> +				: "a" (EACCEPT),
> +				  "b" (&secinfo),
> +				  "c" (op.epc_addr));
> +
> +	op.ret = rax;
> +	memcpy(_op, &op, sizeof(op));
> +}
> +
>  static void do_encl_init_tcs_page(void *_op)
>  {
> -	struct encl_op_init_tcs_page *op = _op;
> -	void *tcs = (void *)op->tcs_page;
> +	struct encl_op_init_tcs_page op;
> +	void *tcs;
>  	uint32_t val_32;
>  
> +	SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
> +	tcs = (void *)op.tcs_page;
> +	ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(tcs, PAGE_SIZE);
> +	ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(get_enclave_base() + op.ssa, PAGE_SIZE);
> +	ASSERT_INSIDE_ENCLAVE(get_enclave_base() + op.entry, 1);
> +
>  	memset(tcs, 0, 16);			/* STATE and FLAGS */
> -	memcpy(tcs + 16, &op->ssa, 8);		/* OSSA */
> +	memcpy(tcs + 16, &op.ssa, 8);		/* OSSA */
>  	memset(tcs + 24, 0, 4);			/* CSSA */
>  	val_32 = 1;
>  	memcpy(tcs + 28, &val_32, 4);		/* NSSA */
> -	memcpy(tcs + 32, &op->entry, 8);	/* OENTRY */
> +	memcpy(tcs + 32, &op.entry, 8);		/* OENTRY */
>  	memset(tcs + 40, 0, 24);		/* AEP, OFSBASE, OGSBASE */
>  	val_32 = 0xFFFFFFFF;
>  	memcpy(tcs + 64, &val_32, 4);		/* FSLIMIT */
> @@ -86,32 +148,54 @@ static void do_encl_init_tcs_page(void *_op)
>  	memset(tcs + 72, 0, 4024);		/* Reserved */
>  }
>  
> -static void do_encl_op_put_to_buf(void *op)
> +static void do_encl_op_put_to_buf(void *_op)
>  {
> -	struct encl_op_put_to_buf *op2 = op;
> +	struct encl_op_get_from_buf op;
> +
> +	SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
>  
> -	memcpy(&encl_buffer[0], &op2->value, 8);
> +	memcpy(&encl_buffer[0], &op.value, 8);
> +	memcpy(_op, &op, sizeof(op));
>  }
>  
> -static void do_encl_op_get_from_buf(void *op)
> +static void do_encl_op_get_from_buf(void *_op)
>  {
> -	struct encl_op_get_from_buf *op2 = op;
> +	struct encl_op_get_from_buf op;
>  
> -	memcpy(&op2->value, &encl_buffer[0], 8);
> +	SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
> +
> +	memcpy(&op.value, &encl_buffer[0], 8);
> +	memcpy(_op, &op, sizeof(op));
>  }
>  
>  static void do_encl_op_put_to_addr(void *_op)
>  {
> -	struct encl_op_put_to_addr *op = _op;
> +	struct encl_op_put_to_addr op;
> +
> +	SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
>  
> -	memcpy((void *)op->addr, &op->value, 8);
> +	/*
> +	 * NOTE: not checking is_outside_enclave(op.addr, 8) here
> +	 * deliberately allows arbitrary writes to enclave memory for
> +	 * testing purposes.
> +	 */
> +	memcpy((void *)op.addr, &op.value, 8);
> +	memcpy(_op, &op, sizeof(op));
>  }
>  
>  static void do_encl_op_get_from_addr(void *_op)
>  {
> -	struct encl_op_get_from_addr *op = _op;
> +	struct encl_op_get_from_addr op;
> +
> +	SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(_op, &op);
>  
> -	memcpy(&op->value, (void *)op->addr, 8);
> +	/*
> +	 * NOTE: not checking is_outside_enclave(op.addr, 8) here
> +	 * deliberately allows arbitrary reads from enclave memory for
> +	 * testing purposes.
> +	 */
> +	memcpy(&op.value, (void *)op.addr, 8);
> +	memcpy(_op, &op, sizeof(op));
>  }
>  
>  static void do_encl_op_nop(void *_op)
> @@ -131,9 +215,10 @@ void encl_body(void *rdi,  void *rsi)
>  		do_encl_emodpe,
>  		do_encl_init_tcs_page,
>  	};
> +	struct encl_op_header op;
>  
> -	struct encl_op_header *op = (struct encl_op_header *)rdi;
> +	SAFE_COPY_STRUCT(rdi, &op);
>  
> -	if (op->type < ENCL_OP_MAX)
> -		(*encl_op_array[op->type])(op);
> +	if (op.type < ENCL_OP_MAX)
> +		(*encl_op_array[op.type])(rdi);
>  }
> -- 
> 2.34.1

BR, Jarkko

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