Message-ID: <CAEivzxcM2=nwtTJ7ZUwubk0m4Fr+otuqzJhp+bRAYLMXuEYZgg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 21 Jul 2023 17:43:45 +0200
From:   Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@...onical.com>
To:     Xiubo Li <xiubli@...hat.com>
Cc:     Gregory Farnum <gfarnum@...hat.com>,
        Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, stgraber@...ntu.com,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@...il.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>, ceph-devel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/14] ceph: support idmapped mounts

On Thu, Jul 20, 2023 at 8:36 AM Xiubo Li <xiubli@...hat.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 7/19/23 19:57, Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 18, 2023 at 4:49 PM Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
> > <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@...onical.com> wrote:
> >> On Tue, Jul 18, 2023 at 3:45 AM Xiubo Li <xiubli@...hat.com> wrote:
> [...]
> >> No, the idea is to stop mapping a caller_{uid, gid}. And to add a new
> >> fields like
> >> inode_owner_{uid, gid} which will be idmapped (this field will be specific only
> >> for those operations that create a new inode).
> > I've decided to write some summary of different approaches and
> > elaborate tricky places.
> >
> > Current implementation.
> >
> > We have head->caller_{uid,gid} fields mapped in according
> > to the mount's idmapping. But as we don't have information about
> > mount's idmapping in all call stacks (like ->lookup case), we
> > are not able to map it always and they are left untouched in these cases.
> >
> > This tends to an inconsistency between different inode_operations,
> > for example ->lookup (don't have an access to an idmapping) and
> > ->mkdir (have an idmapping as an argument).
> >
> > This inconsistency is absolutely harmless if the user does not
> > use UID/GID-based restrictions. Because in this use case head->caller_{uid,gid}
> > fields used *only* to set inode owner UID/GID during the inode_operations
> > which create inodes.
> >
> > Conclusion 1. head->caller_{uid,gid} fields have two meanings
> > - UID/GID-based permission checks
> > - inode owner information
> >
> > Solution 0. Ignore the issue with UID/GID-based restrictions and idmapped mounts
> > until we are not blamed by users ;-)
> >
> > As far as I can see you are not happy about this way. :-)
> >
> > Solution 1. Let's add mount's idmapping argument to all inode_operations
> > and always map head->caller_{uid,gid} fields.
> >
> > Not a best idea, because:
> > - big modification of VFS layer
> > - ideologically incorrect, for instance ->lookup should not care
> > and know *anything* about mount's idmapping, because ->lookup works
> > not on the mount level (it's not important who and through which mount
> > triggered the ->lookup). Imagine that you've dentry cache filled and call
> > open(...) in this case ->lookup can be uncalled. But if the user was not lucky
> > enough to have cache filled then open(..) will trigger the lookup and
> > then ->lookup results will be dependent on the mount's idmapping. It
> > seems incorrect
> > and unobvious consequence of introducing such a parameter to ->lookup operation.
> > To summarize, ->lookup is about filling dentry cache and dentry cache
> > is superblock-level
> > thing, not mount-level.
> >
> > Solution 2. Add some kind of extra checks to ceph-client and ceph
> > server to detect that
> > mount idmappings used with UID/GID-based restrictions and restrict such mounts.
> >
> > Seems not ideal to me too. Because it's not a fix, it's a limitation
> > and this limitation is
> > not cheap from the implementation perspective (we need heavy changes
> > in ceph server side and
> > client side too). Btw, currently VFS API is also not ready for that,
> > because we can't
> > decide if idmapped mounts are allowed or not in runtime. It's a static
> > thing that should be declared
> > with FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in (struct file_system_type)->fs_flags. Not a
> > big deal, but...
> >
> > Solution 3. Add a new UID/GID fields to ceph request structure in
> > addition to head->caller_{uid,gid}
> > to store information about inode owners (only for inode_operations
> > which create inodes).
> >
> > How does it solves the problem?
> > With these new fields we can leave head->caller_{uid,gid} untouched
> > with an idmapped mounts code.
> > It means that UID/GID-based restrictions will continue to work as intended.
> >
> > At the same time, new fields (let say "inode_owner_{uid,gid}") will be
> > mapped in accordance with
> > a mount's idmapping.
> >
> > This solution seems ideal, because it is philosophically correct, it
> > makes cephfs idmapped mounts to work
> > in the same manner and way as idmapped mounts work for any other
> > filesystem like ext4.
>
> Okay, this approach sounds more reasonable to me. But you need to do
> some extra work to make it to be compatible between {old,new} kernels
> and  {old,new} cephs.
>
> So then the caller uid/gid will always be the user uid/gid issuing the
> requests as now.

Dear Xiubo,

I've posted a PR https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/52575

Kind regards,
Alex

>
> Thanks
>
> - Xiubo
>
>
> > But yes, this requires cephfs protocol changes...
> >
> > I personally still believe that the "Solution 0" approach is optimal
> > and we can go with "Solution 3" way
> > as the next iteration.
> >
> > Kind regards,
> > Alex
> >
> >> And also the same for other non-create requests. If
> >>> so this will be incorrect for the cephx perm checks IMO.
> >> Thanks,
> >> Alex
> >>
> >>> Thanks
> >>>
> >>> - Xiubo
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> This makes a problem with path-based UID/GID restriction mechanism,
> >>>> because it uses head->caller_{uid,gid} fields
> >>>> to check if UID/GID is permitted or not.
> >>>>
> >>>> So, the problem is that we have one field in ceph request for two
> >>>> different needs - to control permissions and to set inode owner.
> >>>> Christian pointed that the most saner way is to modify ceph protocol
> >>>> and add a separate field to store inode owner UID/GID,
> >>>> and only this fields should be idmapped, but head->caller_{uid,gid}
> >>>> will be untouched.
> >>>>
> >>>> With this approach, we will not affect UID/GID-based permission rules
> >>>> with an idmapped mounts at all.
> >>>>
> >>>> Kind regards,
> >>>> Alex
> >>>>
> >>>>> Thanks
> >>>>>
> >>>>> - Xiubo
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>>> Alex
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Thanks
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> - Xiubo
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Thanks,
> >>>>>>>> Alex
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Thanks
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> - Xiubo
> >>>>>>>>>
>

Powered by blists - more mailing lists