Message-ID: <ZL+shMg5LJgYlsDd@example.org>
Date:   Tue, 25 Jul 2023 13:05:40 +0200
From:   Alexey Gladkov <legion@...nel.org>
To:     Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Cc:     Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] Add a new fchmodat4() syscall

On Tue, Jul 11, 2023 at 05:14:24PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 11, 2023 at 02:24:51PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> > * Alexey Gladkov:
> > 
> > > This patch set adds fchmodat4(), a new syscall. The actual
> > > implementation is super simple: essentially it's just the same as
> > > fchmodat(), but LOOKUP_FOLLOW is conditionally set based on the flags.
> > > I've attempted to make this match "man 2 fchmodat" as closely as
> > > possible, which says EINVAL is returned for invalid flags (as opposed to
> > > ENOTSUPP, which is currently returned by glibc for AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW).
> > > I have a sketch of a glibc patch that I haven't even compiled yet, but
> > > seems fairly straight-forward:
> > >
> > >     diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/fchmodat.c b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/fchmodat.c
> > >     index 6d9cbc1ce9e0..b1beab76d56c 100644
> > >     --- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/fchmodat.c
> > >     +++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/fchmodat.c
> > >     @@ -29,12 +29,36 @@
> > >      int
> > >      fchmodat (int fd, const char *file, mode_t mode, int flag)
> > >      {
> > >     -  if (flag & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
> > >     -    return INLINE_SYSCALL_ERROR_RETURN_VALUE (EINVAL);
> > >     -#ifndef __NR_lchmod		/* Linux so far has no lchmod syscall.  */
> > >     +  /* There are four paths through this code:
> > >     +      - The flags are zero.  In this case it's fine to call fchmodat.
> > >     +      - The flags are non-zero and glibc doesn't have access to
> > >     +	__NR_fchmodat4.  In this case all we can do is emulate the error codes
> > >     +	defined by the glibc interface from userspace.
> > >     +      - The flags are non-zero, glibc has __NR_fchmodat4, and the kernel has
> > >     +	fchmodat4.  This is the simplest case, as the fchmodat4 syscall exactly
> > >     +	matches glibc's library interface so it can be called directly.
> > >     +      - The flags are non-zero, glibc has __NR_fchmodat4, but the kernel does
> > 
> > If you define __NR_fchmodat4 on all architectures, we can use these
> > constants directly in glibc.  We no longer depend on the UAPI
> > definitions of those constants, to cut down the number of code variants,
> > and to make glibc's system call profile independent of the kernel header
> > version at build time.
> > 
> > Your version is based on 2.31, more recent versions have some reasonable
> > emulation for fchmodat based on /proc/self/fd.  I even wrote a comment
> > describing the same buggy behavior that you witnessed:
> > 
> > +      /* Some Linux versions with some file systems can actually
> > +        change symbolic link permissions via /proc, but this is not
> > +        intentional, and it gives inconsistent results (e.g., error
> > +        return despite mode change).  The expected behavior is that
> > +        symbolic link modes cannot be changed at all, and this check
> > +        enforces that.  */
> > +      if (S_ISLNK (st.st_mode))
> > +       {
> > +         __close_nocancel (pathfd);
> > +         __set_errno (EOPNOTSUPP);
> > +         return -1;
> > +       }
> > 
> > I think there was some kernel discussion about that behavior before, but
> > apparently, it hasn't led to fixes.
> 
> I think I've explained this somewhere else a couple of months ago but
> just in case you weren't on that thread or don't remember and apologies
> if you should already know.
> 
> A lot of filesystem will happily update the mode of a symlink. The VFS
> doesn't do anything to prevent this from happening. This is filesystem
> specific.
> 
> The EOPNOTSUPP you're seeing very likely comes from POSIX ACLs.
> Specifically it comes from filesystems that call posix_acl_chmod(),
> e.g., btrfs via
> 
>         if (!err && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
>                 err = posix_acl_chmod(idmap, dentry, inode->i_mode);
> 
> Most filesystems don't implement i_op->set_acl() for POSIX ACLs.
> So posix_acl_chmod() will report EOPNOTSUPP. By the time
> posix_acl_chmod() is called, most filesystems will have finished
> updating the inode. POSIX ACLs also often aren't integrated into
> transactions so a rollback wouldn't even be possible on some
> filesystems.
> 
> Any filesystem that doesn't implement POSIX ACLs at all will obviously
> never fail unless it blocks mode changes on symlinks. Or filesystems
> that do have a way to rollback failures from posix_acl_chmod(), or
> filesystems that do return an error on chmod() on symlinks such as 9p,
> ntfs, ocfs2.
> 
> > 
> > I wonder if it makes sense to add a similar error return to the system
> > call implementation?
> 
> Hm, blocking symlink mode changes is pretty regression prone. And just
> blocking it through one interface seems weird and makes things even more
> inconsistent.
> 
> So two options I see:
> (1) minimally invasive:
>     Filesystems that do call posix_acl_chmod() on symlinks need to be
>     changed to stop doing that.
> (2) might hit us on the head invasive:
>     Try and block symlink mode changes in chmod_common().
> 
> Thoughts?
> 

We have third option. We can choose not to call chmod_common and return an
error right away:

diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 39a7939f0d00..86a427a2a083 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -679,7 +679,9 @@ static int do_fchmodat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, umode_t mode, int l
 retry:
        error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
        if (!error) {
-               error = chmod_common(&path, mode);
+               error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+               if (!(flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) || !S_ISLNK(path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+                       error = chmod_common(&path, mode);
                path_put(&path);
                if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
                        lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;

It doesn't seem to be invasive.

-- 
Rgrds, legion

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