linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 14/20] KVM:VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs

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Message-ID: <e3751a2d-7eb9-2add-8c3f-172bf133af75@intel.com>
Date:   Thu, 27 Jul 2023 11:48:27 +0800
From:   "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To:     Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
CC:     <seanjc@...gle.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>, <peterz@...radead.org>,
        <john.allen@....com>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 14/20] KVM:VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs


On 7/26/2023 4:30 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 20, 2023 at 11:03:46PM -0400, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>> Pass through CET MSRs when the associated feature is enabled.
>> Shadow Stack feature requires all the CET MSRs to make it
>> architectural support in guest. IBT feature only depends on
>> MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_S_CET to enable both user and
>> supervisor IBT.
> If a guest supports SHSTK only, KVM has no way to prevent guest from
> enabling IBT because the U/S_CET are pass-thru'd. it is a problem.

Yes, this is a CET architectural defect when only SHSTK is enabled. But 
it shouldn't

bring issues, right? I will highlight it in commit log.

>
> I am wondering if it is necessary to pass-thru U/S_CET MSRs. Probably
> the answer is yes at least for U_CET MSR because the MSR is per-task.

Agree,  also xsaves/xrstors in guest could fail if they're not pass-thrued.

>
>> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> index b29817ec6f2e..85cb7e748a89 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> @@ -709,6 +709,10 @@ static bool is_valid_passthrough_msr(u32 msr)
>> 	case MSR_LBR_CORE_TO ... MSR_LBR_CORE_TO + 8:
>> 		/* LBR MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs() */
>> 		return true;
>> +	case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
>> +	case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
>> +	case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
>> +		return true;
>> 	}
>>
>> 	r = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr) != -ENOENT;
>> @@ -7758,6 +7762,34 @@ static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> 		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
>> }
>>
>> +static void vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> +	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
>> +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET,
>> +					  MSR_TYPE_RW, false);
>> +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET,
>> +					  MSR_TYPE_RW, false);
>> +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP,
>> +					  MSR_TYPE_RW, false);
>> +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP,
>> +					  MSR_TYPE_RW, false);
>> +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP,
>> +					  MSR_TYPE_RW, false);
>> +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP,
>> +					  MSR_TYPE_RW, false);
>> +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB,
>> +					  MSR_TYPE_RW, false);
>> +		return;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
>> +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET,
>> +					  MSR_TYPE_RW, false);
>> +		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET,
>> +					  MSR_TYPE_RW, false);
>> +	}
> This is incorrect. see
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZJYzPn7ipYfO0fLZ@google.com/

Yes, will add the lost counterpart, thanks!

>
>> +}
>> +
>> static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> {
>> 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>> @@ -7825,6 +7857,9 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>
>> 	/* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */
>> 	vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
>> +
>> +	if (kvm_is_cet_supported())
> Nit: this check is not necessary. here isn't a hot path. and if
> kvm_is_cet_supported() is false, guest_can_use(., X86_FEATURE_SHSTK/IBT)
> should be false.

Yes, I think it can be removed.

>
>> +		vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(vcpu);
>> }
>>
>> static u64 vmx_get_perf_capabilities(void)
>> -- 
>> 2.27.0
>>