linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 4/5] KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow guest from using !visible slots for page tables

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 28 Jul 2023 17:51:59 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Reima Ishii <ishiir@...cc.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
Subject: [PATCH v2 4/5] KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow guest from using !visible slots
 for page tables

Explicitly inject a page fault if guest attempts to use a !visible gfn
as a page table.  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot() will naturally handle the
case where there is no memslot, but doesn't catch the scenario where the
gfn points at a KVM-internal memslot.

Letting the guest backdoor its way into accessing KVM-internal memslots
isn't dangerous on its own, e.g. at worst the guest can crash itself, but
disallowing the behavior will simplify fixing how KVM handles !visible
guest root gfns (immediately synthesizing a triple fault when loading the
root is architecturally wrong).

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index 0662e0278e70..122bfc0124d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 	++walker->level;
 
 	do {
+		struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
 		unsigned long host_addr;
 
 		pt_access = pte_access;
@@ -381,7 +382,11 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 		if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
 			return 0;
 
-		host_addr = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa),
+		slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa));
+		if (!kvm_is_visible_memslot(slot))
+			goto error;
+
+		host_addr = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(slot, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa),
 					    &walker->pte_writable[walker->level - 1]);
 		if (unlikely(kvm_is_error_hva(host_addr)))
 			goto error;
-- 
2.41.0.487.g6d72f3e995-goog