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Message-ID: <f899f0af-6aea-7cd6-cd44-a2082cb267cb@huawei.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 10:01:59 +0800
From: Gong Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@...wei.com>
To: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>,
<selinux@...r.kernel.org>
CC: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@...weicloud.com>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 6/9] selinux: avoid implicit conversions in services
code
On 2023/07/28 23:54, Christian Göttsche wrote:
> Use u32 as the output parameter type in security_get_classes() and
> security_get_permissions(), based on the type of the symtab nprim
> member.
>
> Declare the read-only class string parameter of
> security_get_permissions() const.
>
> Avoid several implicit conversions by using the identical type for the
> destination.
>
> Use the type identical to the source for local variables.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
Reviewed-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@...wei.com>
> ---
> v2: avoid declarations in init-clauses of for loops
> ---
> security/selinux/include/security.h | 4 ++--
> security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 7 ++++---
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
> 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> index 668e393a9709..074d439fe9ad 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> @@ -312,9 +312,9 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
> u32 *peer_sid);
>
> int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
> - char ***classes, int *nclasses);
> + char ***classes, u32 *nclasses);
> int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
> - char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
> + const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms);
> int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
> int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> index f79e96f0f221..b969e87fd870 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> @@ -1798,7 +1798,8 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
> char *objclass, int classvalue,
> struct dentry *dir)
> {
> - int i, rc, nperms;
> + u32 i, nperms;
> + int rc;
> char **perms;
>
> rc = security_get_permissions(newpolicy, objclass, &perms, &nperms);
> @@ -1868,8 +1869,8 @@ static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
> struct dentry *class_dir,
> unsigned long *last_class_ino)
> {
> -
> - int rc, nclasses, i;
> + u32 i, nclasses;
> + int rc;
> char **classes;
>
> rc = security_get_classes(newpolicy, &classes, &nclasses);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index cf4b87ec4a0e..3a03243f52e7 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
> struct sidtab *sidtab;
> struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;
> struct type_datum *type;
> - int index;
> + u32 index;
> int rc;
>
> if (!selinux_initialized())
> @@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> if (!selinux_initialized()) {
> - int i;
> + u32 i;
>
> for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
> const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
> @@ -2821,7 +2821,6 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
> {
> struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
> struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
> - int len;
> u16 sclass;
> struct genfs *genfs;
> struct ocontext *c;
> @@ -2843,7 +2842,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
> return -ENOENT;
>
> for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
> - len = strlen(c->u.name);
> + size_t len = strlen(c->u.name);
> if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
> (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
> break;
> @@ -3331,7 +3330,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
> {
> struct class_datum *datum = d;
> char *name = k, **classes = args;
> - int value = datum->value - 1;
> + u32 value = datum->value - 1;
>
> classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
> if (!classes[value])
> @@ -3341,7 +3340,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
> }
>
> int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
> - char ***classes, int *nclasses)
> + char ***classes, u32 *nclasses)
> {
> struct policydb *policydb;
> int rc;
> @@ -3357,7 +3356,8 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
> rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
> *classes);
> if (rc) {
> - int i;
> + u32 i;
> +
> for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
> kfree((*classes)[i]);
> kfree(*classes);
> @@ -3371,7 +3371,7 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
> {
> struct perm_datum *datum = d;
> char *name = k, **perms = args;
> - int value = datum->value - 1;
> + u32 value = datum->value - 1;
>
> perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
> if (!perms[value])
> @@ -3381,10 +3381,11 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
> }
>
> int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
> - char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
> + const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms)
> {
> struct policydb *policydb;
> - int rc, i;
> + u32 i;
> + int rc;
> struct class_datum *match;
>
> policydb = &policy->policydb;
> @@ -3599,7 +3600,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
> /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
> int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
> {
> - int i;
> + u32 i;
>
> for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
> struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
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