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Message-ID: <20230801165312.GB2607694@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 19:53:12 +0300
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>,
James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
"Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@....com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 10/36] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we
support GCS
On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 02:43:19PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> Use VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 for guarded control stack pages.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
> ---
> Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 2 +-
> fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++
> include/linux/mm.h | 12 +++++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
> index 6ccb57089a06..086a0408a4d7 100644
> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
> @@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ encoded manner. The codes are the following:
> mt arm64 MTE allocation tags are enabled
> um userfaultfd missing tracking
> uw userfaultfd wr-protect tracking
> - ss shadow stack page
> + ss shadow/guarded control stack page
I've missed this in Rick's patches, but it's not a page but area.
> == =======================================
>
> Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
> diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> index cfab855fe7e9..e8c50848bb16 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> @@ -711,6 +711,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> [ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)] = "ss",
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_GCS
> + [ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)] = "ss",
> #endif
> };
> size_t i;
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index 43fe625b85aa..3f939ae212e5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -372,7 +372,17 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
> * having a PAGE_SIZE guard gap.
> */
> # define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5
> -#else
> +#endif
> +
> +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_GCS)
> +/*
> + * arm64's Guarded Control Stack implements similar functionality and
> + * has similar constraints to shadow stacks.
> + */
> +# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef VM_SHADOW_STACK
> # define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_NONE
> #endif
>
>
> --
> 2.30.2
>
>
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
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