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Message-Id: <20230801083318.8363-17-xin3.li@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 01:32:58 -0700
From: Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
To: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-edac@...r.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
"K . Y . Srinivasan" <kys@...rosoft.com>,
Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@...rosoft.com>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu@...nel.org>, Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>,
Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@...il.com>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>,
Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@...labora.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Babu Moger <babu.moger@....com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@....com>,
Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>,
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@...hat.com>,
Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
Breno Leitao <leitao@...ian.org>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
Ze Gao <zegao2021@...il.com>, Fei Li <fei1.li@...el.com>,
Conghui <conghui.chen@...el.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@...ux.alibaba.com>,
Jane Malalane <jane.malalane@...rix.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
Yantengsi <siyanteng@...ngson.cn>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>,
Sathvika Vasireddy <sv@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH RESEND v9 16/36] x86/fred: Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task
From: "H. Peter Anvin (Intel)" <hpa@...or.com>
Entering a new task is logically speaking a return from a system call
(exec, fork, clone, etc.). As such, if ptrace enables single stepping
a single step exception should be allowed to trigger immediately upon
entering user space. This is not optional.
NMI should *never* be disabled in user space. As such, this is an
optional, opportunistic way to catch errors.
Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task, thus once
the new task enters user space, single-step trap and NMI are both
enabled immediately.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@...or.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
---
Changes since v8:
* Use high-order 48 bits above the lowest 16 bit SS only when FRED
is enabled (Thomas Gleixner).
---
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 6d5fed29f552..0b47871a6141 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <asm/resctrl.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/fsgsbase.h>
+#include <asm/fred.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
/* Not included via unistd.h */
#include <asm/unistd_32_ia32.h>
@@ -507,8 +508,18 @@ void x86_gsbase_write_task(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long gsbase)
static void
start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
unsigned long new_sp,
- unsigned int _cs, unsigned int _ss, unsigned int _ds)
+ u16 _cs, u16 _ss, u16 _ds)
{
+ /*
+ * Paranoia: High-order 48 bits above the lowest 16 bit SS are
+ * discarded by the legacy IRET instruction on all Intel, AMD,
+ * and Cyrix/Centaur/VIA CPUs, thus can be set unconditionally,
+ * even when FRED is not enabled. But we choose the safer side
+ * to use these bits only when FRED is enabled.
+ */
+ const unsigned long ssx_flags = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ?
+ (FRED_SSX_SOFTWARE_INITIATED | FRED_SSX_NMI) : 0;
+
WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != current_pt_regs());
if (static_cpu_has(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)) {
@@ -522,11 +533,11 @@ start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
loadsegment(ds, _ds);
load_gs_index(0);
- regs->ip = new_ip;
- regs->sp = new_sp;
- regs->cs = _cs;
- regs->ss = _ss;
- regs->flags = X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+ regs->ip = new_ip;
+ regs->sp = new_sp;
+ regs->csx = _cs;
+ regs->ssx = _ss | ssx_flags;
+ regs->flags = X86_EFLAGS_IF | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
}
void
--
2.34.1
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