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Message-Id: <20230802154831.2147855-3-ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2023 17:48:10 +0200
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
To: linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Evgeniy Baskov <baskov@...ras.ru>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@...ras.ru>,
Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@...hat.com>,
Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@....com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
Subject: [PATCH v8 02/23] x86/head_64: Store boot_params pointer in callee save register
Instead of pushing/popping %RSI to/from the stack every time a function
is called from startup_64(), store it in a callee preserved register
and grab it from there when its value is actually needed.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 31 +++++++-------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index c5b9289837dcbad2..18b07ab2e8a8ab08 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -51,7 +51,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
* for us. These identity mapped page tables map all of the
* kernel pages and possibly all of memory.
*
- * %rsi holds a physical pointer to real_mode_data.
+ * %RSI holds the physical address of the boot_params structure
+ * provided by the bootloader. Preserve it in %R15 so C function calls
+ * will not clobber it.
*
* We come here either directly from a 64bit bootloader, or from
* arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S.
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
* compiled to run at we first fixup the physical addresses in our page
* tables and then reload them.
*/
+ mov %rsi, %r15
/* Set up the stack for verify_cpu() */
leaq (__end_init_task - PTREGS_SIZE)(%rip), %rsp
@@ -75,9 +78,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
shrq $32, %rdx
wrmsr
- pushq %rsi
call startup_64_setup_env
- popq %rsi
/* Now switch to __KERNEL_CS so IRET works reliably */
pushq $__KERNEL_CS
@@ -93,12 +94,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
* Activate SEV/SME memory encryption if supported/enabled. This needs to
* be done now, since this also includes setup of the SEV-SNP CPUID table,
* which needs to be done before any CPUID instructions are executed in
- * subsequent code.
+ * subsequent code. Pass the boot_params pointer as the first argument.
*/
- movq %rsi, %rdi
- pushq %rsi
+ movq %r15, %rdi
call sme_enable
- popq %rsi
#endif
/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
@@ -111,9 +110,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
* programmed into CR3.
*/
leaq _text(%rip), %rdi
- pushq %rsi
call __startup_64
- popq %rsi
/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
addq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
@@ -127,8 +124,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
* At this point the CPU runs in 64bit mode CS.L = 1 CS.D = 0,
* and someone has loaded a mapped page table.
*
- * %rsi holds a physical pointer to real_mode_data.
- *
* We come here either from startup_64 (using physical addresses)
* or from trampoline.S (using virtual addresses).
*
@@ -153,6 +148,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ /* Clear %R15 which holds the boot_params pointer on the boot CPU */
+ xorq %r15, %r15
+
/*
* Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be
* added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3.
@@ -199,13 +197,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
* hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
* attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
* the next RET instruction.
- * %rsi carries pointer to realmode data and is callee-clobbered. Save
- * and restore it.
*/
- pushq %rsi
movq %rax, %rdi
call sev_verify_cbit
- popq %rsi
/*
* Switch to new page-table
@@ -365,9 +359,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
wrmsr
/* Setup and Load IDT */
- pushq %rsi
call early_setup_idt
- popq %rsi
/* Check if nx is implemented */
movl $0x80000001, %eax
@@ -403,9 +395,8 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
pushq $0
popfq
- /* rsi is pointer to real mode structure with interesting info.
- pass it to C */
- movq %rsi, %rdi
+ /* Pass the boot_params pointer as first argument */
+ movq %r15, %rdi
.Ljump_to_C_code:
/*
--
2.39.2
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