linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/4] keys: Introduce tsm keys

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 4 Aug 2023 10:34:01 -0600
From:   Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
To:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc:     dhowells@...hat.com,
        Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com>, peterz@...radead.org,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] keys: Introduce tsm keys

> > >
> > > > > + * shared secret and then use that communication channel to instantiate
> > > > > + * other keys. The expectation is that the requester of the tsm key
> > > > > + * knows a priori the key-exchange protocol associated with the
> > > > > + * 'pubkey'.
> > > >
> > > > Can we instead be very specific about what protocols and cryptography
> > > > are being used?
> > >
> > > Again this is a contract to which the kernel is not a party. The
> > > requester knows the significance of the user-data, and it knows where to
> > > send the combined user-data plus quote to provision further secrets.
> > >
> > > Not that I like that arrangement, but the kernel is not enabled by these
> > > TSM implementations to know much more than "user-data in", "report out".
> >
> > Can you explain why using this key API is better than the ioctl
> > version? Is there an overhead to adding keys?
>
> Setting aside that folks that have been involved in the Keyring
> subsystem a lot longer than I are not keen on this usage [1], I expect
> the overhead is negligible. Keys are already used in RPC scenarios and
> can be destroyed immediately after being instantiated and read.

OK the overhead is negligible. But why is this any better?

To me this seems strictly worse to me as a user since I have much less
input into the hardware attestation which is one of the primary
benefits of confidential compute. I don't want the kernel limiting
what cryptographic algorithm I use, or limiting attestation reports to
signing pubkeys.

I understand having a proliferation of similar drivers may not be
ideal but given the hardware lift required to make confidential
compute happen will we really see too many?

>
> [1]: http://lore.kernel.org/r/c6576d1682b576ba47556478a98f397ed518a177.camel@HansenPartnership.com