[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <ZMzF6e8jjGY2YNjm@sunil-laptop>
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2023 15:03:29 +0530
From: Sunil V L <sunilvl@...tanamicro.com>
To: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-acpi@...r.kernel.org, linux-pci@...r.kernel.org,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
Len Brown <lenb@...nel.org>,
Daniel Scally <djrscally@...il.com>,
Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@...ux.intel.com>,
Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@...ux.intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@...aro.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Anup Patel <anup@...infault.org>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
Robert Moore <robert.moore@...el.com>,
Haibo Xu <haibo1.xu@...el.com>,
Andrew Jones <ajones@...tanamicro.com>,
Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@...rochip.com>,
Atish Kumar Patra <atishp@...osinc.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 08/21] RISC-V: ACPI: RHCT: Add function to get CBO
block sizes
On Fri, Aug 04, 2023 at 09:00:45AM +0300, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 03, 2023 at 11:29:03PM +0530, Sunil V L wrote:
> > CBO related block size in ACPI is provided by RHCT. Add
> > support to read the CMO node in RHCT to get this information.
>
> ...
>
> > + if (!table) {
>
> Why not positive conditional?
>
Sure.
> > + rhct = (struct acpi_table_rhct *)acpi_get_rhct();
> > + if (!rhct)
> > + return -ENOENT;
> > + } else {
> > + rhct = (struct acpi_table_rhct *)table;
> > + }
>
> ...
>
> > + end = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_rhct_node_header, rhct, rhct->header.length);
>
> > +
>
> Blank line here is not needed.
>
Okay.
> > + for (node = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_rhct_node_header, rhct, rhct->node_offset);
> > + node < end;
> > + node = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_rhct_node_header, node, node->length)) {
>
> > + for (int i = 0; i < hart_info->num_offsets; i++) {
> > + ref_node = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_rhct_node_header,
> > + rhct, hart_info_node_offset[i]);
> > + if (ref_node->type == ACPI_RHCT_NODE_TYPE_CMO) {
> > + cmo_node = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_rhct_cmo_node,
> > + ref_node, size_hdr);
> > + if (cbom_size)
> > + *cbom_size = 1 << cmo_node->cbom_size;
> > +
> > + if (cboz_size)
> > + *cboz_size = 1 << cmo_node->cboz_size;
> > +
> > + if (cbop_size)
> > + *cbop_size = 1 << cmo_node->cbop_size;
>
> BIT() in all three cases?
>
Sure.
> But how you guarantee it will not overflow? I mean who prevents cboX_size to be
> bigger than 30 (note also that 31 in your case is Undefined Behaviour in
> accordance with the C standard).
>
Good catch!. Let me add a check that the value is not more than 30.
Thanks!
Sunil
Powered by blists - more mailing lists