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Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 11:48:57 -0700
From: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>, dhowells@...hat.com,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] keys: Introduce a keys frontend for attestation reports
> Isn't this more runtime attestation? In which case you wouldn't use
> the boot report. I assume someone somewhere is hacking the TPM-TLS
> protocol to also do RTMRs, but it strikes me we could just use a vTPM
> and the existing protocols.
>
> Even if you don't do anything as complex as TPM-TLS (and continuing
> runtime attestation), you can still make TLS conditioned on a private
> key released after a successful boot time attestation. Since the boot
> evidence never changes, there's not much point doing it on each
> connection, so relying on a private key conditioned on boot evidence is
> just as good.
>
> James
>
The TPM quote will need to be bound to the VM instance, so there will
still be a hardware attestation in there that incorporates the user's
challenge.
Anything less than that is subject to replay attacks, no? Am I missing
a clever trick?
--
-Dionna Glaze, PhD (she/her)
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