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Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 13:04:53 -0700
From: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>, dhowells@...hat.com,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] keys: Introduce a keys frontend for attestation reports
> Trusting the vTPM is a one time thing. Once trust in the TPM is
> established, you don't need to be worried about replay and you can just
> use standard TPM primitives for everything onward, even when doing
> point in time runtime attestation.
>
It's a one time thing for who? It seems like you're still only looking
at the 1. use case and not the 2. use case. Every different person
establishing a connection with the service will need to independently
establish trust in the TPM.
--
-Dionna Glaze, PhD (she/her)
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