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Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 15:33:43 -0700
From: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>, dhowells@...hat.com,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] keys: Introduce a keys frontend for attestation reports
> For an ephemeral TPM, the EK should be guaranteed to be random and
> therefore non repeating, so there's not much need for the nonce to add
> non-repeatability. So, in theory, the vTPM/EK binding can be published
> once and relied on even for multiple different tenant endpoints, sort
> of like the EK cert for a physical TPM.
>
Okay that sounds reasonable.
Regarding my other comment about daemons, we might already be in that
state for containers even without the sysfs proposal, given that the
sev-guest device requires root.
We'd need a daemon to provide protected access to the attestation
report (e.g., https://github.com/confidential-containers/attestation-agent)
so that's a bit of a sad situation.
--
-Dionna Glaze, PhD (she/her)
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