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Message-ID: <e417a89e-15af-e6ed-5df5-382640dd9eeb@suse.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2023 12:04:16 +0300
From: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, David.Kaplan@....com,
Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com, jpoimboe@...nel.org,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 00/17] Fix up the recent SRSO patches
On 9.08.23 г. 10:12 ч., Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> Since I wasn't invited to the party (even though I did retbleed), I get to
> clean things up afterwards :/
>
> Anyway, this here overhauls the SRSO patches in a big way.
>
> I claim that AMD retbleed (also called Speculative-Type-Confusion -- not to be
> confused with Intel retbleed, which is an entirely different bug) is
> fundamentally the same as this SRSO -- which is also caused by STC. And the
> mitigations are so similar they should all be controlled from a single spot and
> not conflated like they are now.
>
> As such, at the end of the ride the new kernel command line and srso sysfs
> files are no more and all we're left with is a few extra retbleed options.
>
> Aside of that; this deals with a few implementation issues -- but not all known
> issues. Josh and Andrew are telling me there's a problem when running inside
> virt due to how this checks the microcode. I'm hoping either of those two gents
> will add a patch to address this.
The microcode issue should have been fixed as Boris added a safe_wrmsr
call which checks for the presence of SBPB bit on zen3/4.
>
>
>
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