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Message-ID: <6c5157fd-0feb-bce0-c160-f8d89a06f640@semihalf.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 11:08:34 +0200
From: Dmytro Maluka <dmy@...ihalf.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
Gil Cukierman <cukie@...gle.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@...il.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, kernel-team@...roid.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, io-uring@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
Joel Granados <j.granados@...sung.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>,
Takaya Saeki <takayas@...omium.org>,
Tomasz Nowicki <tn@...ihalf.com>,
Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@...gle.com>,
Andres Freund <andres@...razel.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Add LSM access controls for io_uring_setup
On 8/9/23 19:28, Dmytro Maluka wrote:
> So one of the questions I'm wondering about is: if Android implemented
> preventing execution of any io_uring code by non-trusted processes
> (via seccomp or any other way), how much would it help to reduce the
> risk of attacks, compared to its current SELinux based solution?
And why exactly I'm wondering about that: AFAICT, Android folks are
concerned about the high likelihood of vulnerabilities in io_uring code
just like we (ChromeOS folks) are, and that is the main reason why
Android takes care of restricting io_uring usage in the first place.
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