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Message-ID: <20230815212931.GA3863294@dev-arch.thelio-3990X>
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2023 14:29:31 -0700
From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, David.Kaplan@....com,
Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com, jpoimboe@...nel.org,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, nik.borisov@...e.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/11] x86/cpu: Clean up SRSO return thunk mess
Hi Peter,
On Mon, Aug 14, 2023 at 01:44:31PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
<snip>
> arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 ++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 ++++--
> arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 -
> arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 2 -
> 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> @@ -342,9 +342,15 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_
> extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[];
>
> extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
> +
> +extern void zen_return_thunk(void);
> +extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
> +extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
> +
> extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
> extern void srso_untrain_ret(void);
> extern void srso_untrain_ret_alias(void);
> +
> extern void entry_ibpb(void);
>
> extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void);
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -1034,6 +1034,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
> case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET:
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
> + x86_return_thunk = zen_return_thunk;
>
> if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
> boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
> @@ -2451,10 +2452,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio
> */
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
>
> - if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19)
> + if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) {
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS);
> - else
> + x86_return_thunk = srso_alias_return_thunk;
> + } else {
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO);
> + x86_return_thunk = srso_return_thunk;
> + }
> srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
> } else {
> pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> @@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
> #endif
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
> -. = ASSERT((__ret & 0x3f) == 0, "__ret not cacheline-aligned");
> +. = ASSERT((zen_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "zen_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned");
> . = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned");
> #endif
>
> --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
> @@ -151,22 +151,20 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_a
> .section .text..__x86.rethunk_untrain
>
> SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
> + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
> ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
> ASM_NOP2
> lfence
> - jmp __x86_return_thunk
> + jmp srso_alias_return_thunk
> SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
> __EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
>
> .section .text..__x86.rethunk_safe
> #endif
>
> -/* Needs a definition for the __x86_return_thunk alternative below. */
> SYM_START(srso_safe_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
> -#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
> lea 8(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_SP
> UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
> -#endif
> ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
> ret
> int3
> @@ -174,9 +172,16 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(srso_safe_ret_alias)
>
> .section .text..__x86.return_thunk
>
> +SYM_CODE_START(srso_alias_return_thunk)
> + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
> + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
> + call srso_safe_ret_alias
> + ud2
> +SYM_CODE_END(srso_alias_return_thunk)
> +
> /*
> * Safety details here pertain to the AMD Zen{1,2} microarchitecture:
> - * 1) The RET at __x86_return_thunk must be on a 64 byte boundary, for
> + * 1) The RET at zen_return_thunk must be on a 64 byte boundary, for
> * alignment within the BTB.
> * 2) The instruction at zen_untrain_ret must contain, and not
> * end with, the 0xc3 byte of the RET.
> @@ -184,7 +189,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(srso_safe_ret_alias)
> * from re-poisioning the BTB prediction.
> */
> .align 64
> - .skip 64 - (__ret - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc
> + .skip 64 - (zen_return_thunk - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc
> SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
> ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
> /*
> @@ -192,16 +197,16 @@ SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL,
> *
> * TEST $0xcc, %bl
> * LFENCE
> - * JMP __x86_return_thunk
> + * JMP zen_return_thunk
> *
> * Executing the TEST instruction has a side effect of evicting any BTB
> * prediction (potentially attacker controlled) attached to the RET, as
> - * __x86_return_thunk + 1 isn't an instruction boundary at the moment.
> + * zen_return_thunk + 1 isn't an instruction boundary at the moment.
> */
> .byte 0xf6
>
> /*
> - * As executed from __x86_return_thunk, this is a plain RET.
> + * As executed from zen_return_thunk, this is a plain RET.
> *
> * As part of the TEST above, RET is the ModRM byte, and INT3 the imm8.
> *
> @@ -213,13 +218,13 @@ SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL,
> * With SMT enabled and STIBP active, a sibling thread cannot poison
> * RET's prediction to a type of its choice, but can evict the
> * prediction due to competitive sharing. If the prediction is
> - * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation
> + * evicted, zen_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation
> * which will be contained safely by the INT3.
> */
> -SYM_INNER_LABEL(__ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
> +SYM_INNER_LABEL(zen_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
> ret
> int3
> -SYM_CODE_END(__ret)
> +SYM_CODE_END(zen_return_thunk)
>
> /*
> * Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete.
> @@ -230,7 +235,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__ret)
> * Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction.
> * INT3 is for SLS protection.
> */
> - jmp __ret
> + jmp zen_return_thunk
> int3
> SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret)
> __EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret)
> @@ -256,6 +261,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(srso_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLO
> ret
> int3
> int3
> + /* end of movabs */
> lfence
> call srso_safe_ret
> ud2
> @@ -263,12 +269,19 @@ SYM_CODE_END(srso_safe_ret)
> SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret)
> __EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret)
>
> -SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk)
> +SYM_CODE_START(srso_return_thunk)
> UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
> ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
> - ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp __ret", "call srso_safe_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
> - "call srso_safe_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
> + call srso_safe_ret
> ud2
> +SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk)
> +
> +SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk)
> + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
> + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
> + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
> + ret
> + int3
> SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
>
> --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
> +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
> @@ -829,6 +829,6 @@ bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym)
>
> bool arch_is_embedded_insn(struct symbol *sym)
> {
> - return !strcmp(sym->name, "__ret") ||
> + return !strcmp(sym->name, "zen_return_thunk") ||
> !strcmp(sym->name, "srso_safe_ret");
> }
>
>
I applied this change on top of -tip master and linux-next, where it
appears to break i386_defconfig (I see this error in other
configurations too but defconfig is obviously a simple target) with both
GCC and LLVM:
i386-linux-ld: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.o: in function `cpu_select_mitigations':
bugs.c:(.init.text+0xe61): undefined reference to `zen_return_thunk'
i386-linux-ld: bugs.c:(.init.text+0xe66): undefined reference to `x86_return_thunk'
ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: x86_return_thunk
>>> referenced by bugs.c
>>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.o:(retbleed_select_mitigation) in archive vmlinux.a
ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: zen_return_thunk
>>> referenced by bugs.c
>>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.o:(retbleed_select_mitigation) in archive vmlinux.a
It is still present at the head of the series, just with the function
rename.
i386-linux-ld: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.o: in function `cpu_select_mitigations':
bugs.c:(.init.text+0xe61): undefined reference to `retbleed_return_thunk'
i386-linux-ld: bugs.c:(.init.text+0xe66): undefined reference to `x86_return_thunk'
ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: x86_return_thunk
>>> referenced by bugs.c
>>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.o:(retbleed_select_mitigation) in archive vmlinux.a
ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: retbleed_return_thunk
>>> referenced by bugs.c
>>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.o:(retbleed_select_mitigation) in archive vmlinux.a
This configuration does have
# CONFIG_RETHUNK is not set
but turning it on does not resolve the x86_return_thunk error...
i386-linux-ld: arch/x86/kernel/static_call.o: in function `__static_call_transform':
static_call.c:(.ref.text+0x4a): undefined reference to `x86_return_thunk'
i386-linux-ld: static_call.c:(.ref.text+0x137): undefined reference to `x86_return_thunk'
i386-linux-ld: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.o: in function `cpu_select_mitigations':
bugs.c:(.init.text+0xef2): undefined reference to `x86_return_thunk'
ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: x86_return_thunk
>>> referenced by static_call.c
>>> arch/x86/kernel/static_call.o:(__static_call_transform) in archive vmlinux.a
>>> referenced by static_call.c
>>> arch/x86/kernel/static_call.o:(__static_call_transform) in archive vmlinux.a
>>> referenced by bugs.c
>>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.o:(retbleed_select_mitigation) in archive vmlinux.a
I'd keep digging but I am running out of time for the day, hence just
the report rather than a fix.
Cheers,
Nathan
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