linux-kernel - Re: [syzbot] [ntfs?] WARNING in do_open

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Message-ID: <20230818191239.3cprv2wncyyy5yxj@f>
Date:   Fri, 18 Aug 2023 21:12:39 +0200
From:   Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@...il.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        syzbot <syzbot+6ec38f7a8db3b3fb1002@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
        anton@...era.com, brauner@...nel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-ntfs-dev@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [ntfs?] WARNING in do_open_execat

On Fri, Aug 18, 2023 at 10:33:26AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> This is a double-check I left in place, since it shouldn't have been reachable:
> 
>         /*
>          * may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be
>          * impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious
>          * and check again at the very end too.
>          */
>         err = -EACCES;
>         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
>                          path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
>                 goto exit;
> 

As I mentioned in my other e-mail, the check is racy -- an unlucky
enough remounting with noexec should trip over it, and probably a chmod
too.

However, that's not what triggers the warn in this case.

The ntfs image used here is intentionally corrupted and the inode at
hand has a mode of 777 (as in type not specified).

Then the type check in may_open():
        switch (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) {

fails to match anything.

This debug printk:
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index e56ff39a79bc..05652e8a1069 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3259,6 +3259,10 @@ static int may_open(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path,
                if ((acc_mode & MAY_EXEC) && path_noexec(path))
                        return -EACCES;
                break;
+       default:
+               /* bogus mode! */
+               printk(KERN_EMERG "got bogus mode inode!\n");
+               return -EACCES;
        }

        error = inode_permission(idmap, inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);

catches it.

All that said, I think adding a WARN_ONCE here is prudent, but I
don't know if denying literally all opts is the way to go.

Do other filesystems have provisions to prevent inodes like this from
getting here?