linux-kernel - [PATCH v5 12/37] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack

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Message-Id: <20230822-arm64-gcs-v5-12-9ef181dd6324@kernel.org>
Date:   Tue, 22 Aug 2023 14:56:45 +0100
From:   Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
To:     Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
        Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>,
        James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
        Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
        "Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@....com>
Cc:     "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
        Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
        Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
        Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 12/37] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack

Map pages flagged as being part of a GCS as such rather than using the
full set of generic VM flags.

This is done using a conditional rather than extending the size of
protection_map since that would make for a very sparse array.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c          | 13 ++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
index c21849ffdd88..4c4615867713 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
 			return false;
 	}
 
+	if (system_supports_gcs() && (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
+		/* An executable GCS isn't a good idea */
+		if (vm_flags & (VM_EXEC | VM_ARM64_BTI))
+			return false;
+	}
+
 	return true;
 
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
index 8f5b7ce857ed..e6fc7ef83ea1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
@@ -79,9 +79,20 @@ arch_initcall(adjust_protection_map);
 
 pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags)
 {
-	pteval_t prot = pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags &
+	pteval_t prot;
+
+	/* If this is a GCS then only interpret VM_WRITE. */
+	if (system_supports_gcs() && (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
+		if (vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+			prot = _PAGE_GCS;
+		else
+			prot = _PAGE_GCS_RO;
+	} else {
+		prot = pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags &
 				   (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)]);
+	}
 
+	/* VM_ARM64_BTI on a GCS is rejected in arch_valdiate_flags() */
 	if (vm_flags & VM_ARM64_BTI)
 		prot |= PTE_GP;
 

-- 
2.30.2