linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH mm-unstable v1 1/4] mm/swap: stop using page->private on tail pages for THP

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Message-ID: <CAJD7tkbHp5tJYb3T0Y_yGcqwkAimPrdQ2SAgSNwVaMFbBFK8BA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 23 Aug 2023 08:31:16 -0700
From:   Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@...gle.com>
To:     David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Seth Jennings <sjenning@...hat.com>,
        Dan Streetman <ddstreet@...e.org>,
        Vitaly Wool <vitaly.wool@...sulko.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH mm-unstable v1 1/4] mm/swap: stop using page->private on
 tail pages for THP_SWAP

On Wed, Aug 23, 2023 at 8:26 AM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On 23.08.23 17:21, Yosry Ahmed wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 23, 2023 at 8:17 AM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 23.08.23 17:12, Yosry Ahmed wrote:
> >>> On Mon, Aug 21, 2023 at 9:09 AM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> Let's stop using page->private on tail pages, making it possible to
> >>>> just unconditionally reuse that field in the tail pages of large folios.
> >>>>
> >>>> The remaining usage of the private field for THP_SWAP is in the THP
> >>>> splitting code (mm/huge_memory.c), that we'll handle separately later.
> >>>>
> >>>> Update the THP_SWAP documentation and sanity checks in mm_types.h and
> >>>> __split_huge_page_tail().
> >>>>
> >>>> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
> >>>
> >>> The mm part looks good to me (with the added fixup):
> >>>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@...gle.com>
> >>
> >> Thanks!
> >>
> >>>>    /**
> >>>> diff --git a/include/linux/swap.h b/include/linux/swap.h
> >>>> index bb5adc604144..84fe0e94f5cd 100644
> >>>> --- a/include/linux/swap.h
> >>>> +++ b/include/linux/swap.h
> >>>> @@ -339,6 +339,15 @@ static inline swp_entry_t folio_swap_entry(struct folio *folio)
> >>>>           return entry;
> >>>>    }
> >>>>
> >>>> +static inline swp_entry_t page_swap_entry(struct page *page)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> +       struct folio *folio = page_folio(page);
> >>>> +       swp_entry_t entry = folio_swap_entry(folio);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +       entry.val += page - &folio->page;
> >>>> +       return entry;
> >>>> +}
> >>>> +
> >>>>    static inline void folio_set_swap_entry(struct folio *folio, swp_entry_t entry)
> >>>>    {
> >>>>           folio->private = (void *)entry.val;
> >>>> diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
> >>>> index cc2f65f8cc62..c04702ae71d2 100644
> >>>> --- a/mm/huge_memory.c
> >>>> +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
> >>>> @@ -2446,18 +2446,15 @@ static void __split_huge_page_tail(struct page *head, int tail,
> >>>>           page_tail->index = head->index + tail;
> >>>>
> >>>>           /*
> >>>> -        * page->private should not be set in tail pages with the exception
> >>>> -        * of swap cache pages that store the swp_entry_t in tail pages.
> >>>> -        * Fix up and warn once if private is unexpectedly set.
> >>>> -        *
> >>>> -        * What of 32-bit systems, on which folio->_pincount overlays
> >>>> -        * head[1].private?  No problem: THP_SWAP is not enabled on 32-bit, and
> >>>> -        * pincount must be 0 for folio_ref_freeze() to have succeeded.
> >>>> +        * page->private should not be set in tail pages. Fix up and warn once
> >>>> +        * if private is unexpectedly set.
> >>>>            */
> >>>> -       if (!folio_test_swapcache(page_folio(head))) {
> >>>> -               VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_PAGE(page_tail->private != 0, page_tail);
> >>>> +       if (unlikely(page_tail->private)) {
> >>>> +               VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_PAGE(true, page_tail);
> >>>>                   page_tail->private = 0;
> >>>>           }
> >>>
> >>> Could probably save a couple of lines here:
> >>>
> >>> if (VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_PAGE(page_tail->private != 0, page_tail))
> >>>
> >>>          page_tail->private = 0;
> >>>
> >>
> >> That would mean that we eventually compile out the runtime check
> >>
> >> #define VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_PAGE(cond, page)  BUILD_BUG_ON_INVALID(cond)
> >
> > I thought the warning would be compiled out but not the check, my bad.
>
> I even remembered that VM_WARN_ON_ONCE and friends could/should not be
> used in conditionals.
>
> But we do seem to have two users now:
>
>   $ git grep "if (VM_WARN_ON"
> mm/mmap.c:              if (VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_MM(vma->vm_end != vmi_end, mm))
> mm/mmap.c:              if (VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_MM(vma->vm_start != vmi_start, mm))
>
> But they only do warning-related action, to dump the stack, the vma, ...
>
> So if the warnings get compiled out, also all the other stuff gets compiled out as well,
> which makes sense here.

Funny enough, I did the same grep and immediately thought that since
we have users of that, then it's okay (i.e the check wouldn't be
compiled out). I wasn't thorough enough to actually check what they
are doing :)

>
> --
> Cheers,
>
> David / dhildenb
>