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Message-ID: <CABayD+cQ3+34uJ+gO5t5BTL-FYmFt_q-uq7VVLJePww+v8XErQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2023 15:37:08 -0700
From: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@...gle.com>
To: "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@....com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, thomas.lendacky@....com,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, David.Kaplan@....com,
jacobhxu@...gle.com, patelsvishal@...gle.com, bhillier@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/sev: Make enc_dec_hypercall() accept a size
instead of npages
Reuploading v3 with `Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org`.
On Thu, Aug 24, 2023 at 2:04 AM Gupta, Pankaj <pankaj.gupta@....com> wrote:
>
> On 8/22/2023 12:58 AM, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > enc_dec_hypercall() accepted a page count instead of a size, which
> > forced its callers to round up. As a result, non-page aligned
> > vaddrs caused pages to be spuriously marked as decrypted via the
> > encryption status hypercall, which in turn caused consistent
> > corruption of pages during live migration. Live migration requires
> > accurate encryption status information to avoid migrating pages
> > from the wrong perspective.
> >
> > Fixes: 064ce6c550a0 ("mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed")
> > Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@...gle.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 6 +++---
> > arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 4 +---
> > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 13 ++++++-------
> > 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> > index 7f97a8a97e24..473b16d73b47 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> > @@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
> >
> > int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
> > int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
> > -void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,
> > - bool enc);
> > +void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr,
> > + unsigned long size, bool enc);
> >
> > void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
> >
> > @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0;
> > static inline int __init
> > early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
> > static inline void __init
> > -early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) {}
> > +early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool enc) {}
> >
> > static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> > index 6a36db4f79fd..b8ab9ee5896c 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> > @@ -966,10 +966,8 @@ static void __init kvm_init_platform(void)
> > * Ensure that _bss_decrypted section is marked as decrypted in the
> > * shared pages list.
> > */
> > - nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(__end_bss_decrypted - __start_bss_decrypted,
> > - PAGE_SIZE);
> > early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall((unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted,
> > - nr_pages, 0);
> > + __end_bss_decrypted - __start_bss_decrypted, 0);
> >
> > /*
> > * If not booted using EFI, enable Live migration support.
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
> > index 54bbd5163e8d..6faea41e99b6 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
> > @@ -288,11 +288,10 @@ static bool amd_enc_cache_flush_required(void)
> > return !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT);
> > }
> >
> > -static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
> > +static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool enc)
> > {
> > #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
> > - unsigned long sz = npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
> > - unsigned long vaddr_end = vaddr + sz;
> > + unsigned long vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
> >
> > while (vaddr < vaddr_end) {
> > int psize, pmask, level;
> > @@ -342,7 +341,7 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool e
> > snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, npages);
> >
> > if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> > - enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, npages, enc);
> > + enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, npages << PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
> >
> > return true;
> > }
> > @@ -466,7 +465,7 @@ static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr,
> >
> > ret = 0;
> >
> > - early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(start, PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
> > + early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(start, size, enc);
> > out:
> > __flush_tlb_all();
> > return ret;
> > @@ -482,9 +481,9 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
> > return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, true);
> > }
> >
> > -void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
> > +void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool enc)
> > {
> > - enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, npages, enc);
> > + enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, size, enc);
> > }
> >
> > void __init sme_early_init(void)
>
> Also had this thought to avoid passing the page boundaries calculation
> with npages in-place of existing size based, but no strong opinions.
>
> This seems even better. Thanks!
>
> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
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