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Message-Id: <20230824080712.30327-11-decui@microsoft.com>
Date:   Thu, 24 Aug 2023 01:07:12 -0700
From:   Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>
To:     ak@...ux.intel.com, arnd@...db.de, bp@...en8.de,
        brijesh.singh@....com, dan.j.williams@...el.com,
        dave.hansen@...el.com, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
        haiyangz@...rosoft.com, hpa@...or.com, jane.chu@...cle.com,
        kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com, kys@...rosoft.com,
        linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org, luto@...nel.org, mingo@...hat.com,
        peterz@...radead.org, rostedt@...dmis.org,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
        tglx@...utronix.de, tony.luck@...el.com, wei.liu@...nel.org,
        Jason@...c4.com, nik.borisov@...e.com, mikelley@...rosoft.com
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com,
        rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com, andavis@...hat.com, mheslin@...hat.com,
        vkuznets@...hat.com, xiaoyao.li@...el.com,
        Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 10/10] x86/hyperv: Move the code in ivm.c around to avoid unnecessary ifdef's

Group the code this way so that we can avoid too many ifdef's:

  Data only used in an SNP VM with the paravisor;
  Functions only used in an SNP VM with the paravisor;

  Data only used in an SNP VM without the paravisor;
  Functions only used in an SNP VM without the paravisor;

  Functions only used in a TDX VM, with and without the paravisor;

  Functions used in an SNP or TDX VM, when the paravisor is present;

  Functions always used, even in a regular non-CoCo VM.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>
---

   This patch appears the first time in v3.

 arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 309 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 150 insertions(+), 159 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
index 3d48f823582c..8fb3b28670e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
@@ -30,9 +30,6 @@
 
 #define GHCB_USAGE_HYPERV_CALL	1
 
-static u8 ap_start_input_arg[PAGE_SIZE] __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
-static u8 ap_start_stack[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
-
 union hv_ghcb {
 	struct ghcb ghcb;
 	struct {
@@ -66,10 +63,10 @@ union hv_ghcb {
 	} hypercall;
 } __packed __aligned(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
 
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_save_area *, hv_sev_vmsa);
-
+/* Only used in an SNP VM with the paravisor */
 static u16 hv_ghcb_version __ro_after_init;
 
+/* Functions only used in an SNP VM with the paravisor go here. */
 u64 hv_ghcb_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output, u32 input_size)
 {
 	union hv_ghcb *hv_ghcb;
@@ -247,6 +244,140 @@ static void hv_ghcb_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value)
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
+/* Only used in a fully enlightened SNP VM, i.e. without the paravisor */
+static u8 ap_start_input_arg[PAGE_SIZE] __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+static u8 ap_start_stack[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_save_area *, hv_sev_vmsa);
+
+/* Functions only used in an SNP VM without the paravisor go here. */
+
+#define hv_populate_vmcb_seg(seg, gdtr_base)			\
+do {								\
+	if (seg.selector) {					\
+		seg.base = 0;					\
+		seg.limit = HV_AP_SEGMENT_LIMIT;		\
+		seg.attrib = *(u16 *)(gdtr_base + seg.selector + 5);	\
+		seg.attrib = (seg.attrib & 0xFF) | ((seg.attrib >> 4) & 0xF00); \
+	}							\
+} while (0)							\
+
+static int snp_set_vmsa(void *va, bool vmsa)
+{
+	u64 attrs;
+
+	/*
+	 * Running at VMPL0 allows the kernel to change the VMSA bit for a page
+	 * using the RMPADJUST instruction. However, for the instruction to
+	 * succeed it must target the permissions of a lesser privileged
+	 * (higher numbered) VMPL level, so use VMPL1 (refer to the RMPADJUST
+	 * instruction in the AMD64 APM Volume 3).
+	 */
+	attrs = 1;
+	if (vmsa)
+		attrs |= RMPADJUST_VMSA_PAGE_BIT;
+
+	return rmpadjust((unsigned long)va, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, attrs);
+}
+
+static void snp_cleanup_vmsa(struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = snp_set_vmsa(vmsa, false);
+	if (err)
+		pr_err("clear VMSA page failed (%u), leaking page\n", err);
+	else
+		free_page((unsigned long)vmsa);
+}
+
+int hv_snp_boot_ap(int cpu, unsigned long start_ip)
+{
+	struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)
+		__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	struct sev_es_save_area *cur_vmsa;
+	struct desc_ptr gdtr;
+	u64 ret, retry = 5;
+	struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *start_vp_input;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	if (!vmsa)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	native_store_gdt(&gdtr);
+
+	vmsa->gdtr.base = gdtr.address;
+	vmsa->gdtr.limit = gdtr.size;
+
+	asm volatile("movl %%es, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->es.selector));
+	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->es, vmsa->gdtr.base);
+
+	asm volatile("movl %%cs, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cs.selector));
+	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->cs, vmsa->gdtr.base);
+
+	asm volatile("movl %%ss, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->ss.selector));
+	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->ss, vmsa->gdtr.base);
+
+	asm volatile("movl %%ds, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->ds.selector));
+	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->ds, vmsa->gdtr.base);
+
+	vmsa->efer = native_read_msr(MSR_EFER);
+
+	asm volatile("movq %%cr4, %%rax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cr4));
+	asm volatile("movq %%cr3, %%rax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cr3));
+	asm volatile("movq %%cr0, %%rax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cr0));
+
+	vmsa->xcr0 = 1;
+	vmsa->g_pat = HV_AP_INIT_GPAT_DEFAULT;
+	vmsa->rip = (u64)secondary_startup_64_no_verify;
+	vmsa->rsp = (u64)&ap_start_stack[PAGE_SIZE];
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the SNP-specific fields for this VMSA:
+	 *   VMPL level
+	 *   SEV_FEATURES (matches the SEV STATUS MSR right shifted 2 bits)
+	 */
+	vmsa->vmpl = 0;
+	vmsa->sev_features = sev_status >> 2;
+
+	ret = snp_set_vmsa(vmsa, true);
+	if (!ret) {
+		pr_err("RMPADJUST(%llx) failed: %llx\n", (u64)vmsa, ret);
+		free_page((u64)vmsa);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+	start_vp_input = (struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *)ap_start_input_arg;
+	memset(start_vp_input, 0, sizeof(*start_vp_input));
+	start_vp_input->partition_id = -1;
+	start_vp_input->vp_index = cpu;
+	start_vp_input->target_vtl.target_vtl = ms_hyperv.vtl;
+	*(u64 *)&start_vp_input->vp_context = __pa(vmsa) | 1;
+
+	do {
+		ret = hv_do_hypercall(HVCALL_START_VP,
+				      start_vp_input, NULL);
+	} while (hv_result(ret) == HV_STATUS_TIME_OUT && retry--);
+
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+	if (!hv_result_success(ret)) {
+		pr_err("HvCallStartVirtualProcessor failed: %llx\n", ret);
+		snp_cleanup_vmsa(vmsa);
+		vmsa = NULL;
+	}
+
+	cur_vmsa = per_cpu(hv_sev_vmsa, cpu);
+	/* Free up any previous VMSA page */
+	if (cur_vmsa)
+		snp_cleanup_vmsa(cur_vmsa);
+
+	/* Record the current VMSA page */
+	per_cpu(hv_sev_vmsa, cpu) = vmsa;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #else
 static inline void hv_ghcb_msr_write(u64 msr, u64 value) {}
 static inline void hv_ghcb_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value) {}
@@ -282,6 +413,20 @@ static void hv_tdx_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *val)
 	else
 		*val = args.r11;
 }
+
+u64 hv_tdx_hypercall(u64 control, u64 param1, u64 param2)
+{
+	struct tdx_hypercall_args args = { };
+
+	args.r10 = control;
+	args.rdx = param1;
+	args.r8  = param2;
+
+	(void)__tdx_hypercall_ret(&args);
+
+	return args.r11;
+}
+
 #else
 static inline void hv_tdx_msr_write(u64 msr, u64 value) {}
 static inline void hv_tdx_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value) {}
@@ -309,9 +454,7 @@ void hv_ivm_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value)
 	else if (hv_isolation_type_snp())
 		hv_ghcb_msr_read(msr, value);
 }
-#endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) || defined(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST)
 /*
  * hv_mark_gpa_visibility - Set pages visible to host via hvcall.
  *
@@ -432,141 +575,6 @@ static bool hv_is_private_mmio(u64 addr)
 	return false;
 }
 
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) || defined(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
-
-#define hv_populate_vmcb_seg(seg, gdtr_base)			\
-do {								\
-	if (seg.selector) {					\
-		seg.base = 0;					\
-		seg.limit = HV_AP_SEGMENT_LIMIT;		\
-		seg.attrib = *(u16 *)(gdtr_base + seg.selector + 5);	\
-		seg.attrib = (seg.attrib & 0xFF) | ((seg.attrib >> 4) & 0xF00); \
-	}							\
-} while (0)							\
-
-static int snp_set_vmsa(void *va, bool vmsa)
-{
-	u64 attrs;
-
-	/*
-	 * Running at VMPL0 allows the kernel to change the VMSA bit for a page
-	 * using the RMPADJUST instruction. However, for the instruction to
-	 * succeed it must target the permissions of a lesser privileged
-	 * (higher numbered) VMPL level, so use VMPL1 (refer to the RMPADJUST
-	 * instruction in the AMD64 APM Volume 3).
-	 */
-	attrs = 1;
-	if (vmsa)
-		attrs |= RMPADJUST_VMSA_PAGE_BIT;
-
-	return rmpadjust((unsigned long)va, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, attrs);
-}
-
-static void snp_cleanup_vmsa(struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa)
-{
-	int err;
-
-	err = snp_set_vmsa(vmsa, false);
-	if (err)
-		pr_err("clear VMSA page failed (%u), leaking page\n", err);
-	else
-		free_page((unsigned long)vmsa);
-}
-
-int hv_snp_boot_ap(int cpu, unsigned long start_ip)
-{
-	struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)
-		__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
-	struct sev_es_save_area *cur_vmsa;
-	struct desc_ptr gdtr;
-	u64 ret, retry = 5;
-	struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *start_vp_input;
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	if (!vmsa)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	native_store_gdt(&gdtr);
-
-	vmsa->gdtr.base = gdtr.address;
-	vmsa->gdtr.limit = gdtr.size;
-
-	asm volatile("movl %%es, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->es.selector));
-	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->es, vmsa->gdtr.base);
-
-	asm volatile("movl %%cs, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cs.selector));
-	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->cs, vmsa->gdtr.base);
-
-	asm volatile("movl %%ss, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->ss.selector));
-	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->ss, vmsa->gdtr.base);
-
-	asm volatile("movl %%ds, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->ds.selector));
-	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->ds, vmsa->gdtr.base);
-
-	vmsa->efer = native_read_msr(MSR_EFER);
-
-	asm volatile("movq %%cr4, %%rax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cr4));
-	asm volatile("movq %%cr3, %%rax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cr3));
-	asm volatile("movq %%cr0, %%rax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cr0));
-
-	vmsa->xcr0 = 1;
-	vmsa->g_pat = HV_AP_INIT_GPAT_DEFAULT;
-	vmsa->rip = (u64)secondary_startup_64_no_verify;
-	vmsa->rsp = (u64)&ap_start_stack[PAGE_SIZE];
-
-	/*
-	 * Set the SNP-specific fields for this VMSA:
-	 *   VMPL level
-	 *   SEV_FEATURES (matches the SEV STATUS MSR right shifted 2 bits)
-	 */
-	vmsa->vmpl = 0;
-	vmsa->sev_features = sev_status >> 2;
-
-	ret = snp_set_vmsa(vmsa, true);
-	if (!ret) {
-		pr_err("RMPADJUST(%llx) failed: %llx\n", (u64)vmsa, ret);
-		free_page((u64)vmsa);
-		return ret;
-	}
-
-	local_irq_save(flags);
-	start_vp_input = (struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *)ap_start_input_arg;
-	memset(start_vp_input, 0, sizeof(*start_vp_input));
-	start_vp_input->partition_id = -1;
-	start_vp_input->vp_index = cpu;
-	start_vp_input->target_vtl.target_vtl = ms_hyperv.vtl;
-	*(u64 *)&start_vp_input->vp_context = __pa(vmsa) | 1;
-
-	do {
-		ret = hv_do_hypercall(HVCALL_START_VP,
-				      start_vp_input, NULL);
-	} while (hv_result(ret) == HV_STATUS_TIME_OUT && retry--);
-
-	local_irq_restore(flags);
-
-	if (!hv_result_success(ret)) {
-		pr_err("HvCallStartVirtualProcessor failed: %llx\n", ret);
-		snp_cleanup_vmsa(vmsa);
-		vmsa = NULL;
-	}
-
-	cur_vmsa = per_cpu(hv_sev_vmsa, cpu);
-	/* Free up any previous VMSA page */
-	if (cur_vmsa)
-		snp_cleanup_vmsa(cur_vmsa);
-
-	/* Record the current VMSA page */
-	per_cpu(hv_sev_vmsa, cpu) = vmsa;
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) || defined(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST)
-
 void __init hv_vtom_init(void)
 {
 	enum hv_isolation_type type = hv_get_isolation_type();
@@ -654,20 +662,3 @@ bool hv_isolation_type_tdx(void)
 {
 	return static_branch_unlikely(&isolation_type_tdx);
 }
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
-
-u64 hv_tdx_hypercall(u64 control, u64 param1, u64 param2)
-{
-	struct tdx_hypercall_args args = { };
-
-	args.r10 = control;
-	args.rdx = param1;
-	args.r8  = param2;
-
-	(void)__tdx_hypercall_ret(&args);
-
-	return args.r11;
-}
-
-#endif
-- 
2.25.1

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