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Message-ID: <CAFA6WYNzLj3ZGj0MP_8n-9ZsMrHs+nFyd11XTARTUXHv4gFs3Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2023 19:37:32 +0530
From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
To: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@...aro.org>
Cc: Shyam Saini <shyamsaini@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@...aro.org>,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>,
Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@...aro.org>,
Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@...aro.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mmc@...r.kernel.org,
op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org, linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org,
Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@...aro.org>,
Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@...el.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd.bergmann@...aro.org>,
Tyler Hicks <code@...icks.com>,
"Srivatsa S . Bhat" <srivatsa@...il.mit.edu>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Allen Pais <apais@...ux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC, PATCH 1/1] rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) driver
On Wed, 23 Aug 2023 at 13:34, Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@...aro.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 22, 2023 at 9:07 PM Shyam Saini
> <shyamsaini@...ux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> > do we plan to disable access to RPMB devices, once we have this RPMB
> > driver in place. User space tools like mmc-utils/nvme/ufs utils
> > can still access RPMB and programme the key and should
> > RPMB driver deny access to RPMB ?
>
> We don't break userspace. Just not. This is not an option.
>
> The RPMB subsystem simply has to provide the rpmb character
> device the same way the MMC subsystem did, or provide an
> in-kernel backend to the MMC subsystem so that it can provide
> the same device. Whatever solution is best.
>
> No deprecation and deletion and breaking userspace. Ever.
>
Agree, that's the golden rule of thumb we follow in kernel
development. Also, we still need to allow cases where trusted
provisioning user-space tools can program OP-TEE RPMB key during
factory provisioning. And once that is provisioned, I don't think
there is much harm in still exposing the RPMB device to user-space
since it can't do anything malicious without access to OP-TEE RPMB
key.
-Sumit
> Yours,
> Linus Walleij
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