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Message-ID: <20230828120847.GAZOyOT4IQn1XImJz4@fat_crate.local>
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 14:08:47 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@...nel.org>, lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [GIT PULL] x86/sev for v6.6-rc1
Hi Linus,
please pull the small SEV pile for 6.6.
Thx.
---
The following changes since commit 2ccdd1b13c591d306f0401d98dedc4bdcd02b421:
Linux 6.5-rc6 (2023-08-13 11:29:55 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git tags/x86_sev_for_v6.6_rc1
for you to fetch changes up to ac3f9c9f1b37edaa7d1a9b908bc79d843955a1a2:
x86/sev: Make enc_dec_hypercall() accept a size instead of npages (2023-08-25 13:33:48 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
- Handle the case where the beginning virtual address of the address
range whose SEV encryption status needs to change, is not page aligned
so that callers which round up the number of pages to be decrypted,
would mark a trailing page as decrypted and thus cause corruption
during live migration.
- Return an error from the #VC handler on AMD SEV-* guests when the debug
registers swapping is enabled as a DR7 access should not happen then
- that register is guest/host switched.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alexey Kardashevskiy (1):
x86/sev: Do not handle #VC for DR7 read/write
Steve Rutherford (1):
x86/sev: Make enc_dec_hypercall() accept a size instead of npages
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 4 +---
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 13 ++++++-------
5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
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