linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v7 5/8] KVM: x86/mmu: Don't pass FOLL_GET to __kvm_follow

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Message-ID: <ZPEDmnloiOs/HNr+@google.com>
Date:   Thu, 31 Aug 2023 14:18:18 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     David Stevens <stevensd@...omium.org>
Cc:     Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
        Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 5/8] KVM: x86/mmu: Don't pass FOLL_GET to __kvm_follow_pfn

On Fri, Aug 25, 2023, David Stevens wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 25, 2023 at 12:15 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Aug 24, 2023, David Stevens wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jul 5, 2023 at 7:25 PM Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Jul 04, 2023 at 04:50:50PM +0900, David Stevens wrote:
> > > > > @@ -4529,7 +4540,8 @@ static int kvm_tdp_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > > > >
> > > > >  out_unlock:
> > > > >       read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
> > > > > -     kvm_release_pfn_clean(fault->pfn);
> > > >
> > > > Yet kvm_release_pfn() can still be triggered for the kvm_vcpu_maped gfns.
> > > > What if guest uses a non-referenced page(e.g., as a vmcs12)? Although I
> > > > believe this is not gonna happen in real world...
> > >
> > > kvm_vcpu_map still uses gfn_to_pfn, which eventually passes FOLL_GET
> > > to __kvm_follow_pfn. So if a guest tries to use a non-refcounted page
> > > like that, then kvm_vcpu_map will fail and the guest will probably
> > > crash. It won't trigger any bugs in the host, though.
> > >
> > > It is unfortunate that the guest will be able to use certain types of
> > > memory for some purposes but not for others. However, while it is
> > > theoretically fixable, it's an unreasonable amount of work for
> > > something that, as you say, nobody really cares about in practice [1].
> > >
> > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZBEEQtmtNPaEqU1i@google.com/
> >
> > There are use cases that care, which is why I suggested allow_unsafe_kmap.
> > Specifically, AWS manages their pool of guest memory in userspace and maps it all
> > via /dev/mem.  Without that module param to let userspace opt-in, this series will
> > break such setups.  It still arguably is a breaking change since it requires
> > userspace to opt-in, but allowing such behavior by default is simply not a viable
> > option, and I don't have much sympathy since so much of this mess has its origins
> > in commit e45adf665a53 ("KVM: Introduce a new guest mapping API").
> >
> > The use cases that no one cares about (AFAIK) is allowing _untrusted_ userspace
> > to back guest RAM with arbitrary memory.  In other words, I want KVM to allow
> > (by default) mapping device memory into the guest for things like vGPUs, without
> > having to do the massive and invasive overhaul needed to safely allow backing guest
> > RAM with completely arbitrary memory.
> 
> Do you specifically want the allow_unsafe_kmap breaking change? v7 of
> this series should have supported everything that is currently
> supported by KVM, but you're right that the v8 version of
> hva_to_pfn_remapped doesn't support mapping
> !kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page() pages. That could be supported
> explicitly with allow_unsafe_kmap as you suggested,

I think it needs to be explicit, i.e. needs the admin to opt-in to the unsafe
behavior.